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ABSTRACT
Efficient manpower utilization is essential to minimizing
the cost, and a key element in that is the maintenance of the
optimum balance between civilian and military manpower
14sources. Econuoitic efficiency dictates that as the cost of
military personnel begin to rise relative to the cost of
direct hires, the Services would have an incentive to increase
the use of direct hires, and vice versa. In our empirical
analysis, results indicate that although DOD responded
correctly to factor price changes measured in current dollars,
DoD did not respond to changes in the real price of civilians.
It should have substituted military personnel for civilians
as the real price of civilians inreased. In addition to the
data analysis, this research reviews the issues on the concept
of military-to-civilian conversions, determines the advantages
and .sadvantages of such conversions, examines the associated
factors and their impact, and investigates the premise that
such conversions could be detrimental to the military's
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I. INTRODUCTION
A resource allocation issue that has received a great deal
of attention over the past several years is the substitution
of civilian employees for military personnel, known as
civilianization. A continuing dialogue has centered on this
issue in an effort to reduce the increasing manpowet costs of
the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Proponents of civilianization
have trough" considerable pressure to bear on the Department
of Defense (DoD) to substitute civilians for military
personnel wherever possible.
However, in the rush to identify potential civilian.
substitutions, critics of DoD policies have frequently been
more concerned with whether civilians can be used than with
whether they should be used. That is, many substitutions have
been made on the assumption that civilians are less expensive
than military personnel, without a determination of whether
such substitutions were in fact cost-effective. (Ref. 1: p.
I-5-i]
Once the assumption that civilian personnel are less
expensive is accepted, it is easy to see how the policy
question turned to potential substitution opportunities,
rather than to whether such substitutions would reduce costs.
In other words, measuring the cost implications of a civilian
substitution effort has, as a practical matter, become
secondary to the concern for how many civilians should replace
military personnel.
The problem of determining what positions could
potentially be manned by civilian personnel is not a trivial
matter, given the softness of the criteria that must be used
to make these allocation decisions. Historically, manning
decisions have been the result of numerous factors, including
military requirements, personnel management constraints, cost-
effectiveness, and tradition. [Ref. 2: p. 292] "Military
requirements" means, for example: that there are some job
assignments such as the infantry that are intrinsically
military iu1  nature. The remainder of the jobs could
theoretically be manned by either military or civilian
personnel on the basis of the job tasks alone; but many of
these jobs are, in fact, best manned by uniformed personnel
in order to satisfy certain personnel management constraints,
such as the maintenance of an adequate rotation base or the
provision of sufficient career opportunities.
In addition to the fact that attention has primarily
focused on civilianization potential, it is important to
recognize that civilians have for the most part been viewed
as direct-hire government employees. This is perhaps nowhere
more evident than in the Congress, where the emphasis has been
on urging DoD to perform various activities in-house rather
than to contract out for particular services. However, the use
of contractors to perform certain activities previously
2
conducted by military personnel (or, for that matter, by
direct-hire civilian employees) is another potentially
valuable source of military-civilian substitutions. The use
of contractors to provide janitorial or maintenance services
is just one example.
A. BACKGROUND
A brief look at past manpower conversion actions is
necessary to develop some of the aspect3 that affect military-
-to-civilian conversions. The review divides the history of
manpower conversions into two period6, using the experience
of World War II as a dividing lilie.
1. Pre-World War II Conversions
The predecessors to the present day concept of
substitutability can be traced back to the colonial period.
This would appear to be an obvious fact since the United
States has, throughout its history, placed a traditional
reliance on the citizen-soldier. A natural and high degree of
substitutability between civilians and the military has, in
theory, existed as a built-in feature of the American military
system.
Civilians occupied staff positions throughout the
Revolutionary War, although officers generally were heads of
the staff agencies. Civilians were used extensively in the
engineer and logistical support and service functions to
include acting as drivers for the artillery horses. At the end
3
of the Revolutionary War, the staff and support control
agencies virtually disappeared from the Army. During the War
of 1812, the operation was in many ways similar to the
Revolutionary War except that soldiers replaced civilians as
drivers for the artillery horses. Contractual transportation
was used in the rear supply lines. The generally poor
performance of the Army during the war led to a major
reorganization of the Army. Secretary Calhoun established the
technical bureau under the direction of military officers.
Much of the field labor was still accomplished by civilians,
but completely under military control. Contractual supply and
transportation by civilian companies was stopped. [Ref. 3: pp.
9-10]
The Mexican War was the first timG the Army had to
support an overseas-type operation. The strength of the Army
was such that troops could not be diverted from line to
logistical functions. Since the Calhoun reorganization did not
provide for supply and service organizations, this effort had
to be accomplished by hiring transportation, mechanics,
teamsters, and laborers. From the beginning to the end of the
Civil War, the Army increased in size from about 10,000 to
over 1, 000,000 men. This vast increase in manpower, coupled
with the great geographic expanse of the war, required the
hiring of large numbers of civilians. The requirements for and
thc functions of the civilians remained basically the same as
in previous wars. Before the Spanish-American War, more
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organizational changes were made. An act consolidated the
former Quartermaster General, Commissary, and Pay Departments.
Additionally, this act established a service corps to do the
work of clerks, engineers, firemen, carpenters, blacksmiths,
packers, teamsters, and laborers. [Ref. 3: pp. 10-12]
Two of the greatest problems during the World War I
were getting the troops to France and the in-country labor
needs of the Amrican Expeditionary Forces. The Army owned
ships that were manned by civilians, and civilian-chartered
ships were utilized to transport troops to France. To stop
diverting combat soldiers to labor tasks, a labor bureau
established in France hired local nationals. [Ref. 3: p. 12]
2. Conversions During and After World War II
The concerns of the General Staff for effective
manpower utilization were evident during World War II. Of
about 1,000,000 civilian workers, 8 percent were in general
administration overhead, 7 percent in procurement, and the
remaining 85 percent were in arsenals and manufacturing,
supply depot and po::t operations, and construction. Officers
and enlistees were still used extensively for the
administrative operations at p.sts in the United States. This
concern for effective management of manpower resources
resulted in one of the earliest written policy statements on
civilian substitutability. War Department Circular 103, 15
April 19 -) stated:
5
... While the manpower pool under jurisdiction consists of
both military azud civilian categories, each group
constitutes an essential part in the War Department
program which contemplates the use of civilians in those
positions where military skills and military status are
not essential.. .The release of general service personnel
for duty with combat units is one of the primary
objectives of the War Department. In carrying out that
objective, the policy of the War Department is to
substitute limited service military personnel, including
personnel of the Women's Auxiliary Corps, for general
service personnel. Replacements of military personnel by
male civilians will be confined to those over draft age,
or unfit for military service, and not engaged in an
industry equally vital to the military or civilian effort.
[Ref. 3: p. 143
Other minor amendments of the World war II policies
appeared in later policy statements and documents. Funding
appears to have an increasingly limiting factor as these
revisions basically reaffirmed the quoted policies within
space and fund limitations.
"Project Native Son", one of the earliest Air Force
conversion projects, coordinated the manpower requirements
with congressional limitations and replaced 43,000 military
personnel in overseas areas with approximately 31,000 foreign
or native personnel during 1954 and 1955. Since the Korean War
enlistments were ending, a shortage of skills occurred. While
Project Native Son utilized foreign personnel in civilian
substitution overseas, "Project Home Front" made similar
substitutions in the United States beginning in 1955 and 1956.
[Ref. 4: pp. 9-10]
"Operation Teammate" was undertaken during 1955 and
extended into 1956. This was a deliberate Army program to
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carry out DoD policies to reduce the number of military
personnel in support-type activities with civilians and
utilize the military spaces saved to create new units within
the combat force structure of the Army. Operation Teammate was
terminated after the Army had hired a total of 9, 803 civilians
to replace 10,306 military personnel. The total programmed
number of 12,000 civilians was not hired due to restrictecd
funding, reduced civilian space ceilings, and a scarcity of
certain skills in the civilian labor market. [Ref. 3: pp. 16-
17)
In 1962, the Army agreed to convert 638 military
positions in commissaries and nonappropriated fund activities
to 620 civilian spaces. Later, the Army was informed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to revise the plan
to provide for a conversion of 577 military positions to 471
civilian spaces, without an increase in funds. This required
the Army to absorb the cost of 471 civilian spaces and to
either eliminate or absorb 106 civilian positions. In reality,
this effort was the only implemented portion of a large
planning program to convert 6,000 military positions, titled
"Project 6". The planned conversions, once again, involved
support and service type positions. [Ref. 3: p. 17]
The next major DoD project, called "Project Mix Fix",
was initiated in January 1966 to support President Johnson's
memorandum to expand the military without calling up the
reserves. Sixty-thousand civilians were to be hired to serve
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in place of 75,000 officers and enlistees in noncombat
positions within all the Services. [Ref. 5: p. 125] The South
East Asia (SEA) conflict was the primary force behind the
increased use of civilians. Mix Fix was developed to provide
more personnel for the SEA conflict through the
civilianization of the Continental United States (CONUS)
positions, rather than to trim the costs of the military.
[Ref. 4: pp. 10-14] Phase I of the program was not considered
complete until June 1967, when 99 percent of the conversions
had been accomplished. Phase II, a follow-on civilianization
program, was being planned and coordinated between OSD and the
Services while Phase I was still in progress. The planning for
Phase II differed from Phase I significantly. Some degree of
flexibility was provided by the Secretary of Defense to
categorize the program in two sections: soft skill positions,
in which civilian labor market was expected to be adequate,
and other positions, which the Services could plan to convert
but for which the current labor market might be inadequate.
[Ref. 3: pp. 39-40)
In 1973, another program was initiated, converting
48,000 military positions to 40,000 civilian positions. [Ref.
5: p. 125] The possibility of monetary savings was given as
a reason because military manpower positions require
additional manpower positions to be budgeted for training,
transients, personnel support, medical treatment, welfare, and
recreation. [Ref. 4: p. 13]
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In 1977, the Air Force eliminated 1,150 jobs
previously held by military members by the planned change to
civilian manning of 13 aircraft and warning sites within the
Alaskan Air Command. Also, the Air Force turned over complete
operation of its officers' clubs to civilian employees,
beginning in 1978 and extending over three years. (Ref. 5: pp.
72-73]
The city-protecting sites of antimissile firing units
manned by civilians were formed into units of the National
Cuard and Reserve. The sites were permanent, so that the unit
locations became merely work-sites for local residents.
Military units of the National Guard and Reserve are already
partially manned by full-time civilian employees of the
military establishment. One of the most impressive examples
of support functions performed by civilians is demonstrated
by the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), in direct
support of fleet operations at sea. Civilians operate
efficiently many of these ships which are averaging 30 years
in age. [Ref. 5: pp. 71-72] Also, to ensure the presence of
adequate technical expertise, the Navy has for years used
contract civilian engineers on board deployed ships to fill
the middle and upper enlisted paygrade deficit in various
ratings. These technical service representatives served aboard
Navy combatant vessels throughout the Vietnam War, operating
within Vietnam in support of helicopter operations, and were
9
deployed to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf theater. [Ref. 6:
pp. 20-23]
With all these actions, the number of direct-hire
civilians rose to 1,275,000 in 1969 during the Vietnam
conflict and dropped to 1,049,000 by 1973, at the beginning
of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Civilian employment
continued to drop during the AVF period, and the number of
full-time permanent employees reached a low of 830,000 by the
end of 1980. Then, employment started increasing with
President Reagan's military build-up policy, and reached
D10,000 by the year 1987. Because of the tight defense
budgets, civilian employment started decreasing again since
1987, and the total employment is around 900,000 now.
Another trend is that there has been a gradual shift
in the employment patterns within the direct-hire employment
group, as well as an increase in the number of nonwage-rate
(general schedule) civilians. The data, though, are not clear
with respect to the extent to which this trend is merely a
reflection of the "grade creep" problem (grade enrichment)
found elsewhere in both the military and civil service
personnel systems, or whether it reflects a genuine move
toward a more technically-oriented force. [Ref. 2: pp. 294-
295]
The Services are near the maximum numbers of military-
to-civilian space conversions which can be absorbed 17--ause
of previous conversions, contracting out, and other
10
constrz__nts (e.g., use of civilians in combat, protection of
the rotational base, and imposition of congressional or
budgetary restraints on numbers of civilians). At present,
there are no major conversion actions that are going to take
place in DoD. However, conversions appear to be an on-going
effort in various units, but they generally occur in small
proportions where local commanders can make effective chanyes.
[Ref. 4: p. 14] On the other hand, lifting the legal and
budgetary constraints on the use of civilians in combat-type
positions (some have already been exposed to combat in
previous conflicts:L) could make major substitutions possible
in the future.
B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
The current DoD policy outlines the use of civilian
personnel in place of military personnel, prohibits
conversions which require combat-related personnel or critical
military skills, and uses cost as the primary factor to
During World War II merchant marine seamen were exposed
to combat on a regular basis as a result of enemy submarine
action. The U.S. Maritime Service's percentage of battle
deaths, based on the total who served, was 2.8 percent, second
only to the U.S. Marine Corps with 2.9 percent. Many of these
ships were in escorted convoys or carried armed guards thus
placing them in a quasi-combat status. The U.S. Merchant
Marine, Military Sealift, Navy technical representatives, and
commercial construction crews served both in-country and in
hostile waterways during the Vietnam conflict. The extensive
use of contractor construction employees to supplement the
Army Corps of Engineers ard Navy Cons*ruction Battalions was
unique and example-setting. [Ref. 6: p.17]
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determine the position conversions. (As a matter of fact, many
substitutions have been made on the assumption that civilians
are less expensive than military personnel, as indicated
above.) Although cost is a factor that must be considered,
there are other human resource factors that have an effect on
the organization and its personnel.
The purpose of this research is to review the issues on
the concept of military-to-civilian conversions, determine
the advantages &ind disadvantages of conversions, examine the
associated factors of conversions and their impact with
respect to military functions, and investigate the premise
that such conversions could be detrimental to the mission of
the military even though they may be cost-effective.
Efficient manpower utilization is essential to minimizing
the cost of any required level of defense, and a key element
in efficient manpower utilization is the maintenance of the
optimum balance between civilian and military manpower
resources. It is within this context that this research
undertakes an analysis of issues to determine the feasibility
of civilian substitution-
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This research examines issues related to civilian
substitution for military personnel. The primary focus of the
research effort concerns policy approaches used to determine
whether a military billet can be converted to a civilian
12
position. Secondary research issues involve the military-
essential criteria used in determining whether a military
billet is eligible for civilianization, the military and
civilian cost factors that should be included in determining
the cost-effectiveness of civilian substitution, other factors
that should be considered in substituting civilians for
military personnel, and whether historical data indicate that
military-civilian trade-offs have been made according to
relative prices.
The general methodology includes the following: collecting
information and reviewing the issues on civilian substitution;
analyzing literature in terms of common threads,
inconsistencies, problems, and so on. analyzing historical
data on the trade-offs made by DoD in response to changes in
relative prices (i.e., cost); and interpreting findings.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter 2 examines the major issues in civilianization,
the "military-essential" criterion used in military-to-
civilian conversions, military and civilian cost factors, and
other factors being considered in substituting civilians for
military personnel. In chapter 3 the historical data covering
the period 1974-1989 are reviewed to determine whether
previous military-civilian trade-offs have been made according
to the relative prices of each input. In the last chapter,the
findings of this study are summarized and interpreted.
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II. MAJOR ISSUES
The Department of Defense (DoD) follows three principles
in determining the mix of the defense labor force. First, the
active military manpower in peacetime should be at the minimum
level necessary to satisfy national security objectives.
Second, the private sector should be relied on to provide
goods and services to the maximum extent possible. Third, the
government should conduct its operation in the most cost-
effective manner possible. [Ref. 7: p. 26] These principles
are reflected in the policies that determine the mix of the
defense labor force.
This policy agrees with the intent of Congress, as stated
in Public Law 93-365 enacted in 1975:
It is the sense of Congress that the Department of Defense
shall use the least costly form of manpower that is
consistent with military requirements and other needs of
the Department of Defense. Therefore, in developing the
annual manpower authorization requests to Congress and in
carrying out manpower policies, the Secretary of Defense
shall, in particular, consider the advantage of converting
from one form of manpower to another (military, civilian,
or private contract) for the performance of a specified
job. [Kef. 8: p. 4]
In accordance with this law, the Secretary of Defense
issues more specific guidance to each serrice. The policy of
DoD is that each position must be filled by a civilian unless
there is a good reason, since this is seen as a means of
maintaining an adequate force levels in an all-volunteer
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environment, and since civilians are said to be less costly.
As stated in DoD Directive 1100.4:
Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not
require military incumbents for reasons of law, training,
security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, which
do not require a military background for successful
performance of the duties involved, and which do not
entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible
with civilian employment. [Ref. 9: p. 5]
A later directive, DoD Directive 1400.5, affirmed this basic
policy in 1970, omits reference to the unusual hours
criterion. It also enumerates several benefits of
civilianization that:
Use of civilian employees affords abilities not otherwise
available, assumes continuity of administration and
operation, and provides a nucleus of trained personnel
necessary for expansion in any emergency. [Ref. 8: p. 6]
The key assumption made in scome of these regulations is
that civilian employees are always lce- costly. The J,',',ea of
civilians being less costly is a product of the All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) . Under conscription, military manpower was cheap.
Since the initiation of AVF, military manpower costs increased
steadily to maintain the appropriate accession and retention
levels needed to meet the Services' requirements. As a result
of these increasing costs, the use of civilians in place of
military personnel has become 6conomically attractive.
However, in the rush to identify substitution potential, the
policies have bea-n more concerned with whether civilians can
be -'ied than wluh whether they should be used. Many
sLib,,j cu'.ions h,•ve Leen made on the assumption t.hat civilians
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are cheaper than military personnel, without determining
whether such substitutions were in fact cost-effective. Albro,
in one of the studies conducted for the President's Commission
cn an All-Volunteer Armed Force (on Gates Conunission), simply
assumed that civilians were less expensive, citing casual
observations, such as the supposed lower turnover rates
exhibited by civilian personnel [Ref. 1: p. 1-5-2]. To
illustrate the weakness of this argument, Cooper noted that
direct-hire civilians have averaged turnover rates of between
20 and 25 percent, as compared with about 25 percent for
military personnel [Ref. 2: p. 291]. There appears to be
little difference between the two sources regarding turnover
behavior.
In light of DoD's approach on the civilianization issue,
recommending that civilians be used in positions which do not
require military personnel for reasons mentioned earlier, the
Services set forth their policies. The Army established the
following policy in AR 570-4:
National policy provides that the use of military
personnel be limited to positions which clearly, require
military incu;nbents. The use of civilian employees affords
abilities not otherwise available, assures continuity of
administration and operation, and provides a nucleus of
trained personnel necessary for expansion in any
emergency. [Ref. 10: p. 2]
The Air Force layed out its basic policy regarding the
use of military and civilian personnel in AFR 26-1 as follows:
Workloads will be performed by military for reasons of
military essentiality .... Workloads that do not require
military for military essential reasons are performed in-
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house by in-service civilians or by contract. [Ref. 4: p.
3]
The common point in all these regulations is that once
the assumption that civilian Fersonnel are less expensive is
accepted, the policy question turns to potential substitution
opportunities, rather than to whether such substitutions would
actually reduce costs. The following sections prcvide
discussion of several criteria for civilianization--including
military-essential assignment, cost, and other factors.
A. THE MILITARY ESSENTIAL CRITERION TO DECIDE WHETHER A
PARTICULAR BILLET CAN BE SUBSTITUTED BY A CIVILIAN
The problem of determining what Fositions could be manned
by civilian personnel is not a minor point,given the softness
of the criteria that must be used to make these allocation
decisions.
1. Former Studies
Historically, manning decisions have been the result
of a number of factors, including military requirements,
personnel management constraints, cost-effectiveness, and
tradition (Ref. 2: p. 292] . However, Smoker notes that,
traditionally, comparisons of uniformed and civilian personnel
have not been made, because for certain missions involving
combat or mobilization or training, military personnel were
considered more valuable than civilians. Thus, Smoker points
out that it is necessary to determine in what instances
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military manpower is perceived to have greater value than
civilians, and in what instances military and civilian
personnel could perform equally well. Then it must be
determined whether military or civilian personnel -re the
least costly resource to perform a certain workload. (Ref. 11:
pp. 24-26] To determine where the use of military personnel
yields a greater benefit, he examines workloads traditionally
performed by the military. His list includes the following:
"* Combat workloads performed by combat aircrews, perimeter
defense sentries, surface-ship and submarine crews, and
tank crews, etc.
"* Direct combat and mobility workloads performed by field
maintenance crews, munition loaders, intelligence
collectors, etc.
"* Training workloads required to maintain the high degree
of proficiency necessary to respond to the challenges of
combat, direct combat support, and mobility. [Ref. II: p.
26)
Although these and other workloads are generally perceived to
be military, Smoker notes that there are few instances where
in-house and contract civilian manpower have performed tasks
of this nature 2 In his list, whether combat forces--for
example, Army or Marine Corps infantrymen--should be military
or civilian is obviously not at issue. And few would doubt
that those who directly support the combat forces and who are
2The use of logistics rapid aircraft maintenance and
field teams during the Vietnam conflict are an example of in-
house civilian personnel performing a direct combat support.
And, the civilian airlift of cargo into Vietnam is an example
of military workloads being contracted.
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expected to operate in a combat zone should be uniformed
personnel. The question is what constitutes the combat forces?
The actual distinctions are not as sharp as they initially
appear. As Binkin questioned: ". . .must crews flying and
servicing airlift aircraft similar in configuration to those
used commercially, such as the C-5, be military?"; or, "must
naval support ships, such as oilers and tenders, be manned by
naval personnel?" The problem becomes even more difficult to
judge, when one considers that U.S. combat forces currently
deployed rely on foreign national civilians for certain forms
of support. [Ref. 9: pp. 52-53] Another point in Smoker's
definition of military essentiality is the mobility
requirements. Estimating the size of the deployed forces is
straightforward: for the Army, Marine Corps, and the Air
Force, it includes troops deployed overseas; and for the Navy,
it incorporates sailors aboard ships or overseas. On the other
hand, the number of billets in uiiits in the United States but
designated for deployment--called deployable billets--is more
difficult to estimate. The number of positions in table of
organization and equipment (TO&E) units provides a reasonable
approximation for the Army. These are combat, combat support,
and combat service support units expected to deploy during
wartime. In contrast, the positions in table of distribution
allowances (TDA) are defined as those remaining in the United
States. For the Navy, shore establishment units are not
specified for deployment so that there is no deployable
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position in CONUS for the Navy. The number of Air Force
personnel that might be deployed is the most difficult to
ascertain. Binkin explains that it depends on assumptions
about how long a war might last, expected attrition, and the
like, and adds that under worst-case scenarios, the Air Force
would be likely to consider its entire force as deployable.
[Ref. 9: pp.53-54]
Distinction between civilian and military incumbency
of a position depends upon a number of factors; but Wermuth
ecognizes the basic distinction as the relationship of the
position's incumbent to battle, to combat against an enemy.
Wermuth quotes Greenspan ("The Modern Law of Land in Warfare")
in discussing this point:
The distinction between combatants-noncombatants within
'he armed forces must be taken to correspond to the
di-tinction between fighting troops and troops in service
units. The fighting troops of an army carry out the actual
military operations. Whereas the service troops minister
to the needs of the former and supply their various
requirements .... The functions of noncombatant elements
within the armed forces do not ordinarily bring them into
actual conflict with the enemy, but except for medical
personnel and chaplains .... [Ref. 5: pp.11-12]
To determine civilianization potential, the general
approach was to apply judgmentally a set of selected manpower
utilization criteria to the position authorizations for each
service. These criteria were derived from DoD manpower
utilization criteria punlished in DoD Directive 1400.5. These
seven criteria were: Law, training, security, discipline,
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rotation, combat readiness, and military background [Ref. 12:
p. 7].
Each of the Services has established regulations to
amplify the general directives, and because of their vague
form each has had wide discretion in defining the criteria to
be applied in determining whether or not a position is to be
filled with uniformed personnel. [Ref. 13: p. 50] Binkin gives
the Air Force guidance as an example which specifies the
positions that military personnel will be used:
"* In a unit/position directly engaged in combat functions,
and in direct combat support functions.
"* In a position that requires the exercise of command
control, military training and discipline and which, by
law, must be exercised by military personnel.
"* In a unit that has combat mobility requirements.
"* In a position in which military personnel must gain
experience before they can assume responsibility for a
combat function.
"* In a position that requires certain skills and knowledge
acquired primarily through military training.
"* In a position where, to properly discharge its duties, a
civilian incumbent would be forced to compromise this
legal rights and privileges, or would be required to take
action restricted by law to military personnel.
"* In a position in any area, as necessary, to allow for
normal career progression, and to support the CONUS
overseas rotation prescribed by the Headquarters United
States Air Force.
"* In a position that is ordinarily filled by an in-service
civilian, when no civilian manpower authorization/skills
are available. [Ref. 9: pp. 5-6]
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Binkin continues that for certain positions not considered to
require a military incumbent, the services are confronted with
a choice: whether to fill the billet with a civilian service
employee or to contract for the services. Here, he points out
the prejudice of the official guidance toward contracting. The
Services are guided by:
... the Government's general policy of relying upon the
private enterprise system to supply its needs for products
and services, in preference to engaging in its own
commercial or industrial activity. [Ref. 9: p. 6]
With regard to in-house versus contract-out
determinations, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense's study on civilianization expresses the policy as
that "relying upon the private enterprise for goods and
services except in those instances where it is not in the
national interest to do so." The study cites the Office -f
Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, which lists the
circumstances as:
When procurement from a commercial source would disrupt
or materially delay an agency's program, when it is
necessary for the Government to conduct a commercial or
industrial-type activity for purposes of combat support
or individual and unit retraining of personnel or to
maintain or strengthen mobilization readiness, whenever
the produc, or service is unavailable from an alternative
source when -ieeded, and finally, if procurement from the
private sector would result in higher cost to the
Government. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
Albro, in his study for the Gates Commission, grouped
the authorized positions in each service into logical
categories based upon the force component, function or skill
involved. The categories were then analyzed in terms of seven
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utilization criteria 3 to determine whether one or more of the
criteria were met sufficiently to justify military rather than
civilian manning. The analysis proceeded in five steps:
"* Identification of those force components which must be
prepared for combat deployment at all times (criterion of
combat readiness).
"* Identification of those positions which require military
manning because of the skills involved (all criteria).
"• Identification of those positions in the training base
which require military manning (criterion of military
background).
"* Identification of those positions in the command and
control element which require military manning (criterion
of military background).
"* Identification of those positions which require military
manning to meet service rotation objectives (criterion of
rotation). [Ref. 1: p. 1-5-4]
The remaining positions were designated as potentially
substitutable. A cost analysis of these spaces was conducted
to determine the potential budget reductions which might be
realized through civilian substitution.
A report on the mix of the defense labor force by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower and
Reserve Affairs indicates the same point as Albro did, that
"the policy of DoD is that all spaces be filled by civilians
unless there are compelling reasons otherwise." Military
incumbency is justified as follows:
3Seven criteria are law, training, security, discipline,
rotation, combat readiness, and military background to justify
a military incumbent in a position rather than a civilian.
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When there is a need in law for a military person, when
the type of work to be performed involves combat or direct
combat support, when the position requires military
experience, when a military billet in the United States
is needed to provide for breaks between overseas
assignments, or when the position is used to provide
training and experience to military personnel. [Ref. 8:
p. 2]
Morthole, in his study of converting military
authorizations for Air Force maintenance personnel to civilian
positions, refers to the AFR 26-1, which establishes the
procedures regarding the manpower mix within the Air Force.
The regulation outlines the steps involved to determine which
workloads require either military or civilian personnel. As
pointed out in the previous section, AFR 26-1 states that "the
workloads will be performed by military for reasons of
military essentiality." Those positions that do not require
a military member will be "performed by in-service civilian
employees or by contract". In addition, the regulation
includes criteria and coding instructions for military-
essential positions, the Unsatisfactory Rotation Index
program, and the Critical Military Skills (CMS) program.
Morthole interprets tbh-a three ins'tructions as a result of
past conversion problems.
Military-essential criteria describe specific
positions which require military personnel to perform duties.
According to AFR 26-1:
The d,.termination on whether or not a position must be
military will, in some cases, be judgmental. If so, the
decision must be as objective as possible and backed up
by supporting rational. [Ref. 4: p. 62
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Several codes are described which cross a spectrum of duties
from combat positions to the traditional occupation of
bandsmen and honor guards. Morthole pointed out the only
specific reference to combat capability, referring back to
AFR 26-1 again, those positions which "if not performed, could
impair the Air Force combat capability within approximately
a 36-hour period."
The Unsatisfactory Rotation Index program requires
enough Continental United States (CONUS) positions to allow
military personnel an assignment in the United States to
reduce the amount of overseas time that can have an adverse
effect on morale.
AFR 26-1 also introduces the Critical Military Skills
program, which has the following objective:
To help reduce wartime military skill shortfalls through
appropriate civilian-to-military position conversions,
contracting decisions, and other manpower related actions.
This program promotes improved readiness by ensuring
adequate military manpower by skill; and effective mix
between active and reserve components; and a proper
balance between combat and combat sustaining forces. [Ref.
4: p. 6]
Delaune, in his review of the early 1970s civilian
substitution concepts, identified military-only positions,
which included:
Command and control positions, positions required for
recruiting, positions involved in teaching military
subjects, positions providing direct logistical or
technical support for combat units, and positions required
by law and/or treaty to be occupied by military personnel.
[Ref. 3: p. 22)
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For each of the functional areas such as administrative,
medical, etc., a numerical rating was assigned, ranging from
highly substitutable to least possible for substitution. The
following types of positions were considered "non-
substitutable" according to DoD policy, and were excluded from
consideration:
All strategic retaliatory forces, continental air and
missile defense forces (except certain administrative,
and clerical support personnel), general purpose forces
(except certain types), airlift and sealift forces,
reserve and guard forces, research and development,
general support (with some exceptions), all military
assistance overseas. [Ref. 3: p. 23]
Delaune noted that by establishing such criteria, "functions
related to combat and direct combat support were considered
exclusive military functions which could be performed by
military personnel only."
2. Findings
For many reasons having to do with modern changes in
war, organizational dynamics, and personnel administration,
the proportion of uniformed persons who do the actual war-
fighting is declining within military establishments. At the
same time, the proportion of uniformed persons who perform
supporting activities is rising, allowing more civilians to
also become engaged in military support. [Ref. 5: p. 2)
Wermuth cites Defense Manpower Commission calculations,
showing that as many as 65 percent of all active-duty military
personnel are primarily involved in support activities.
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Poiicy cnanges are required if one wants to go beyond
the position conversions having been done so far. It would
dictate using civilians in units and under conditions that
have traditionally been considered the military's domain. In
today's changing military environment, further substitutions
may be required to reduce the defense budget and allocate
limited resources more effectively.
Binkin gives specific examples to show the possibility
of further conversions. One of them is in Navy fleet support.
Manning support vessels with civilians is not a new concept.
The British Royal Fleet Auxiliary has been manned by civilians
for many years. The problem, as Binkin points out, is the risk
of relying on federal civilian employees for essential fleet
support in the event of a war or other military contingencies.
[Ref. 9: pp. 57-58] On the other hand, Binkin adds that such
concern does not appear to be well-founded, and quotes Emery's
observation on civilian-manned ships that:
in Military Sealift Command's 27-year existence, i.ncluding
the six years of Navy fleet support activity, command
operations have never been hampered by strikes or work
slowdowns. [Ref. 9: p. 58]
The General Accounting Office (GAO) similarly cites
the Navy's controversy that combat readiness is adversely
affected by shortages of trained and experienced sailors at
sea, and recommends that the Navy use civilians in shipyazds
to accomplish work that is normally done by ships' crew during
overhaul. The crew released from overhaul work could be
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reassigned to ships at sea, according to GAO, by alleviating
some of the critical shortages on these ships, or skilled
technicians could be transferred to critical shore activities
such as the Shorte Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs).
In response to the GAO's recommendations, the Navy has set up
a pilot ship decrewing program. One approach is to increase
the utilization of available skills through reassignments of
the kind suggested in this GAO report; another is to increase
the skill levels through training during overhaul. In both
cases, it would be necessary to free the ship's crew from all
or part of the work they would normally do during overhaul,
and assign this workload to civilians at the shipyard. (Ref.
14: p. 1]
Another specific example given by Binkin is the
possibility of transferring the part of airlift and air
refueling missions now carried out by the U.S Air Force to
civilians. Again, the dangers of relying on ci'.i4i-n personnel
have to be considered; but, as Binkin points out, the existing
national policy leans on the use of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) in mobilization planning. CRAF policy gives
authority to the President to mobilize elements of U.S.
commercial airlines during emergencies, which also covers the
airlift personnel and equipment. (Ref. 9: pp. 58-59]
Because of the nature of its operations, the Army
appears to have fewer opportunities than the other Services
to employ civilians in units traditionally manned by soldiers.
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However, support units operating exclusively in rear areas
could be considered for civilian substitution [Ref. 9: p. 59].
GAO, in its study of military personnel in industrial
facilities, observes that the majority of military personnel
are performing supervisory, administrative, and other
technical functions. GAO believes that civilians could do
these functions; in fact, civilians were occupying either
first-or second-level supervisory positions in the operating
departments at the activities mentioned. Theretcre, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct each military
department headquarters in industrial facilities to review all
types of personnel positions, except those designated as being
deployable, or as having a combat or combat-support mission;
and, for each type, to determine whether:
* The position must be filled by military personnel.
* The position could be filled by either military personnel
or civilians and the circumstances in which the position
would be used for military personnel, such as for rotation
or for career development.
* The position neead not be filled by a military incumbent
and should be filled by a civilian. [Ref. 7: pp. 18-19,
26, 29-30]
On the other hand, efforts to allocate resources
effectively may hamper wartime readiness, which should be
considered in all conversion decisions. Foi example, attempts
to balance medical manpower requirements with budgetary
constraints has led to staff reorganization within the Medical
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Service. In 1985, a budget initiative resulted, whereby the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs was charged
by Secretary Weinberger to "redirect resources and change the
composition of the medical force to ensure medical readiness
as the top priority." As a result, beginning on October 1,
1987, the Dental Corps relinquished 98 active duty dental
officer authorizations to favor the Nurse Corps. To compensate
for the lost active duty dental slots, 98 civilian contract
dental slots were made available and located at Air Force
bases throughout CONUS. Civilianization of the Dental Corps
may not reduce the Corps' clinical capability to produce
adequate dental services to maintain a peacetime military.
But, since civilian contract dentists lack the readiness
education and training, the absence of 98 dental officers
schooled, practiced, and dedicated to the military readiness
mission may be realized in peacetime today as well as in a
pos3ible wartime scenario. Dental officers may be called upon
to rely on readiness skills in peacetime, assisting in medical
mass casualty management in response to such conditions as
natural disasters (flood, tornadoes, earthquakes, etc) and
military/nonmilitary accidents involving multiple victims.
Acts of terrorism also present a threat, especially in the
military environment, to which dental officers (as part of a
base disaster team) might be expected to respond.
Civilianization also poses a long-term threat to medical
readiness as it represents a possible source of instability
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in CONUS dental manpower. In the short term, civilianization
may not change the net Air Force peacetime clinical
capability. It does, however, represent a portion of the total
CONUS manpower which can change annually through contract
renewal or disapproval. (Ref. 15: pp. 2, 3, 9-12]
For the reasons mentioned above and the possible
effects of civilianization on wartime readiness, additional
proposals to replace military personnel with civilians should
be carefully examined before any attempt is made to further
change the structure of the force.
B. THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COST FACTORS FOR
COMPARISON
There is a large and growing concern regarding the cost
of national defense. Public opinion is that the economic and
social ills of the country are largely the fault of increased
defense spending. [Ref. 16: p. 1] Much of the interest in
defense spending has focused on personnel-related items. In
fact, more than two million men and women serve today in the
active military forces, and roughly one-third of the
Department of Defense budget is spent directly on these
personnel: on recruiting, training, and transporting them; on
providing for their housing, food, and medical care; and so
on. Personnel costs in the past two decades have been
influenced by the end of military conscription in 1973.
Introduction of the All-Volunteer Force increased personnel
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costs in two ways: the need to induce sufficient numbers of
young men and women to volunteer for military service led to
a substantial increase in basic pay and related expenditures;
and there was a gradual increase in various cost elements, as
first-term personnel were replaced by more senior members.
Because military careers span 20 or more years, the transition
to a mature All-Volunteer Force is still ander way, and future
changes in the experience structures of the enlisted forces
may contin~ie to increase the cost in coming years. [Ref. 17:
pp. 1-2]
These concerns indicate the urgency of searching for a
means of reducing personnel cost increases without causing an
unacceptable reduction in wartime readiness. One possible
answer is to substitute capital for labor wherever
economically feasible. [Ref. 2: p. 277] In addition to broad
allocation decisions dealing with capital and labor, there are
equally important questions in the allocation of resources
within these broad categories. In searching for a solution to
this problem, the military/civilian mix of the force has been
discussed and the argument has been made by many in Congress
and DOD that civilians should be substituted for military
personnel wherever possible because this is seen as a means
of maintaining military force levels in a zero- draft
environment and because they are said to be less costly. This
argument, of course, recognizes that certain billets must be
filled by a. member of the military because of the reasons
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mentioned in the previous section, such as law, training,
security, discipline, rotation, combat readiness or the neel
for a military background to successfully perform assigned
duties that are not subject to civilian substitution. (Ref.
16: p. 1] There are also cases where a job is filled by a
military incumbent even though a civilian could do that job
at least cost without violating the requirements mentioned
above. This is necessary to meet the military mission of DoD.
For example, some maintenance jobs in the Navy could be done
less expensively in peacetime by civilians. However, therea is
a wartime requirement to deploy the entire maintenance
activity to a combat zone. (Ref. 8: p. 12) Thus, the jobs must
be filled by military personnel.
Although "least cost" is an implied criterion in the
guidance concerning mil-tary-civilian determinations, cost
probably was not a primary consideration when the military-
civilian determination policy was first developed. Civilians
were placed in all positions not rec. iring military incumbency
because of the DoD policy that "civilians shall be used in all
positions which do not require military incumbents" for
reasons mentioned above [Ref. 11: p. 27]4. Planners simply
assumed that civilians were less expensive, referring to
4Relative cost was not a criterion for determining which
positions to civilianize. As a result, no consistent method
was applied to compare the cost of military and civilian
manpower resources capable of performing equivalent missions
during the period of civilian substitution programs.
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factors, such as the lower turnover rates of civilians (Ref.
2: p. 291], mentioned in the previous section. Another reason,
leaded plan;.ers to the assumption that civilians were less
expensive, wa3 the misperception that the training and
retirement costs associated with military personnel are
generally well recognized, and the unfunded retirement
liability and training costs associated with direct hires are
less recognized [Ref. 2: p. 300]. Defense manpower planners
were also affected on conversion decisions by the fact that
military personnel generate more secondary support
requirements than do civilians; for example most military
individuals are clothed, housed, fed, trained, and provided
medical treatment by DoD while this is generally not the case
with civilians (Ref. 8: p. 6]. Thus, a military person
generdtes a requirement for some fractional part of another
person to maintain base housing, operate hospitals and
schools, and perform other necessary support functions (Ref.
6: p. 75]. The support "tail" describes the number of these
types of positions required to provide support for military
personnel. GAO conducted a case study at the Naval Weapons
Support Center, Crane, Indiana. Only 23 of the 68 military
personnel at the site were doing center-related work or were
working for other military activities. The remaining 45, plus
10 civilians, were providing support services for the military
complement, such as food and housekeeping, recreation,
commissary and exchange stores, and health care. [Ref. 7: p.
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21] Delaune says the analyses revealed that the support "tail"
ran as high as 36-40 percent of the total force [Ref. 3: p.
26]. Because of this support "tail" associated with military
labor, the substitution of one civilian position for one
military position would allow for the elimination of a small
portion of another military position, thereby creating a net
manpower and financial saving [Ref. 11: pp. 26-27] . While the
figures will vary among the Services, a study by the Central
All-Volunteer Force Task Force, known as the Moot Report,
indicates that the net manpower saving will be over 15
percent, if civilians are substituted for military personnel
[Ref. 13: p. 7]. On the other hand, there would be some offset
to this saving to provide administrative support to newly
employed civilians.
Another factor examined in the early studies was the ratio
of substitution. Morthole, in his study for the Air Force,
emphasized that the Air Force relies on a very high
specialization of tasks, while the use of civilians permits
an increased combine.tion of tasks. Therefore, fewer civilians
can be used to accomplish a particular task. [Ref. 4: p. 8]
A draft study by the Office of The Secretary of Defense in
1964-65 proposed that the appropriate ratio of positions was
about 0.85 civilian to 1.0 military. Delaune, citing the
Army's civilianization program, gives the replacement ratio
of nine civilians to every ten military replaced [Ref. 3: p.
24] A discussion of the civilian/military substitution ratio
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in a Bureau of Naval Personnel study of the Training Deviceman
(TD) rating shows substitution ratios ashore ranging from 0.6
to .82 (that is, 6 to 8.2 civilians would replace 10 military)
[Ref. 6: p. 77] . The estimates derived in Albro's analysis
were based on a 1.0 civilian to 1.1 military overall ratio.
All these assumptions were based on the belief that military
incumbents spend a significant proportion of the normal
workweek on military-related duties not directly associated
with their immediate position assignments (for example, drill,
ceremonies, range-firing, police of barracks, police of the
base, guard duty, and similar chores). Thus, man-hour
availability is greater for the civilian employee in
comparable positions, and civilian incumbents would,
presumably, be more productive in the position, therefore
justifying something less than a one-to-one ratio of
substitution. [Ref. 5: p. 24] On the other hand, Albro made
a counterargument to this assumption that military incumbents
do normally spend a full workweek at their primary position
with military-related duties being accomplished by extending
the workweek beyond 40 hours [Ref. 1: p. 1-5-8].
Thus, a logical starting point is to determine the costs
associated with the two classes of personnel, specifically
their magnitude and how they are broken down by expenditure
category, government funding agency, and the time phasing of
theiz incurrence. While costs such as direct pay, allowances,
and fringe benefits are easily calculated, other components
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of the total cost of personnel--such as the training required
to fill a billet, the cost of support, and the appropriate
attribution of miliLary retirement costs--are not (Ref. 12:
p. 21]. After estimating current costs, we should determine
how they are likely to change in the future; while one class
of personnel may at present appear to be less costly for
filling a particular billet, a policy action that would
attempt to take advantage of this situation could have effects
that would significantly reduce or eliminate the intended
saving [Ref. 4: pp. 29-30). Planners should also consider the
wartime conditions. Civilians were able to engage in some
forms of combat in Vietnam; and in comparison to military
personnel who were doing the same things, they were paid more.
For example, U.S. civilians piloting helicopters on resupply
and leaflet dropping missions in a combat environment were
paid a base salary three or four times the pay of warrant
officers performing exactly the same jobs at the same time and
in the same place. U.S. civilian employees working in Vietnam-
-naturally, in circumstances remote from all but the most
exceptional war danger--received a 25 percent salary
differential for service in a combat zone, although they had,
of course, no combat role. (Ref. 5: pp. 26-27] Until these
questions are answered, we cannot be sure whether a
civilianization policy would result in a net cost or saving.
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1. Comparing the Prssent Cost of Military and Civilians
The total identifiable current and expected future
costs to the federal government are seen as the appropriate
measures for the required analysis. Budget costs are too
narrow to fully capture the impact of employing one rather
than the other class of personnel, because dollar costs are
incurred by several recipients of federal funds over many
budget years [Ref. 2: p. 296-298]. Therefore, Beltramo says
that "costs budgeted by an agency for a particular year do not
completely represent the government's liability for actions
taken in that year." For example, educational benefits and
dependency and indemnity compensation for military personnel
are paid by the Veterans Administration, and military
retirement benefits are paid by the Department of Defense.
Funding for these items--educational benefits, dependency and
indemnity compensation, and retirement benefits--included in
the current budget is the result of past policies. The effect
of current policies on these budget items will be reflected
in future budgets. The government's retirement contribution
for civilians is an example of misrepresentation of current
costs. This retirement contribution leaves a significant
unfunded liability, amounts greater than those provided in the
5However, they are useful, first, for establishing a
benchmark for determining the cost implications c~f a large-
scale substitution of one type of personnel for another; and
second, for comparing the trends over time in the costs of
these different types of personnel [R-f 2: p. 296].
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current budget, and must be added to some future budget to
cover the government's accrued liability (Ref. 2: pp. 297-
298].
Although present value calculations are often used to
compare the relative cost of the two classes of personnel over
time, they hide many of the factors discussed above--including
which agency pays how much and when. At the same time, such
a comparison may be sensitive to the discount rate, which is
often arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, a more detailed
comparison made on a case-by-case basis provides the analyst
with valuable insights. [Ref. 16: p. 3]
Table I demonstrates the cost impact over time and
across the federal bureaucracy of a decision to fill a
hypothetical billet with either a member of the military or
a civilian. As Beltramo points out, the costs in the example
are for illustrative purposes only, and there should be no
inference that they include all appropriate elements or that
the amounts expressed are completely accurate. The E-6/GS-7
comparison is also not necessarily a relevant one, as the
proper trade-off between military rank and civil service grade
must be determined on a billet-by-billet basis. It should also
be noted that to gain the full understanding of this
comparison, an assumption must be made regarding the number
of years over which thte costs will be incurred.
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TABLE I
ANNUAL COST OF MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Annual Costs Annual Costs
Incurred During Incurred After
Incumbency (in $) Termination (in $)
Air Force Civilian Air Force Civilian
Funding Agency E-6 GS-7 E-6 GS-7
AIR FORCE
Base Pay 9,450 10,53
Overtime &
Holiday 0 328
Other Cysts 141 375


















SOURCE: M. N. Beltramo, Considering the Cost of DoD
Personnel, Rand Corporation, p. 4.
IPCS, life and health insurance, terminal leave, etc.
2Medical O&M, recruiting, fringe benefits for civilians.
3Cost of technical training amortized over the years.
4Assumes that civilians receive no job training and does
not amortize specialty training received over later career.
50 percent of base pay X 88 percent probability person will
reach retirement.
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A significant point that is indicated by Beltramo in
this comparison is that the Air Force is required to pay from
its current budget the entire present and future cost, except
the unfunded liability portion of retirement, associated with
emplcying a civilian, but pays only the current costs incurred
by employing a uniformed personnel. Costs that will be
incurred by a military person after he/she leaves the service
are borne almost entirely by other agencies.
Given this perspective, it is reascnable to anticipate
institutional conflict between Congress, DoD, and the
Services, sincc acting in a manner that is less expensive (in
terms of the total picture) may prove to be more costly to the
Services. Thus, the provision of incentives to sLimulate
cooperation on the part of the Services should be considertL.
[Ref. 16: p. 5]
The components of personnel costs have to be examined
to determine how they should be treated, so that comparisons
of military and civilian personnel (such as the one in Table
I) can be meaningful. The following subsection examines the
former studies in terms of the elements of personnel costs in
an attempt to provide a methodology for comparing the cost of
personnel for various decision-related purposes.
41
2. Cost Measures
Cost measures are designed for policy analyses that
detail how a particular DoD policy would affect the desired
size and structure of active and civilian personnel
inventories. The policy action might be a weapons system
deployment or a plan to replace a work center's active duty
personnel with civilians. The analysis would project how such
an action would alter various resource needs, including
changes in personnel inventory size and structure. Then the
cost measures could be used to translate those manpower
changes into their cost implications. [Ref. 18: p. 5]
In the Department of Defense, skilled manpower is both
an input to and an output of defense operations. Thus, we will
examine cost factors in the separate categories of direct and
indirect labor costs.
a. Direct Labor Costs
Direct costs are payments triggered by using
personnel in a productive activity. (Ref. 18: p. 6] There is
disagreement about what constitutes it. Part of the difficulty
arises from the complexities of the military pay system,
which--in addition to cash payments--includes an array of
benefits, some of which are in-kind, some deferred, and others
conditional. And the civilian compensation system, while more
straightforward, has its own argumentative properties. [Ref.
9: pp. 43-44] Because of sharp differences in the
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categorization of costs of these two types of labor, we will
cover the direct cost elements in two different subsections.
(1) Direct Cost of Military Personnel. Palmer, in
his Rand study of the "Incremental Costs of Military and
Civilian Manpower in the Military Services," defines direct
costs as "entitlements which are paid to military personnel
based on their continuing service." He includes the following
items:
"* Basic pay, which all members receive at rates that vary
by grade and length of service.
"* Allowances for subsistence, which most members receive as
cash at one of three daily rates but some receive
subsistence in kind.
"* Allowance for quarters, which nearly half the force
receive as a full cash allowance based on their dependency
status, and another third receives as a partial cash
allowance or a cash supplement for substandard housing,
remaining personnel receive quarters in kind.
"* Assignment-related allowances which are paid only to
selected force members depending on their assignments.
This includes special and incentive pays, variable housing
allowance, which active force members receive to help
cover household expenses that vary by location, and
station allowances/family separation allowances, which is
paid to members stationed overseas.
"* FICA tax on the wages paid to military personnel. However,
unlike most civilian employers, DoD does not have to pay
FICA tax on subsistence and quarters allowances for
military personnel. [Ref. 18: pp. 15-29]
Subsistence and quarters allowances would be taxable if they
were paid by a civilian employer. Therefore, adding military
personnel to DoD workforce could reduce these federal tax
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revenues, and such a revenue loss would be an additional
federal financing cost for military personnel. Rhode
recommends that to obtain the cost to the government, the
foregone tax on benefits be added to the billet costs (Ref.
19: p. 12]. Adjustments for nontaxable allowances also apply
to special and incentive pay when they are relevant to a
policy under analysis.
(2) Direct Cost of Civilian Personnel. This
subsection reviews the direct costs of filling a DoD position
using a member of a civil service paygrade . Palmer's direct
cost elements consist of the following:
"* Base pay, which is regular salaries or wages.
"* Other pays, which are primarily overtime payments
available to all schedules except the Senior Executive
Service (SES), holiday premium, which is available to all
schedules except SES, but rarely used, and duty-related
pay available to all schedules, but used to different
degrees by the Services.
"* Benefits, which includes life insurance, health benefits,
worker's compensation, employer's FICA tax, and pension
benefits. [Ref. 18: pp. 30-36]
b. Indirect Labor Costs
Indirect costs arise in DoD activities that supply
or support manpower used in other operations. Examples are
costs for manpower recruitment, training, relocation, and
6Filling a position means having someone assigned to that
position, recognizing that the assigned individual will be
absent from the position occasionally due to sick leave,
holidays, etc.
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medical care. There is little agreement cn the appropriate
costs for the military and civilian employees and even less
on what indirect costs should be included and how they should
be allocated. And, even when agreement is reached on these
issues, there remains the question of how to link military and
civilian grades 7. It is important -o note that, unlike direct
costs, indirect support costs do not vary proportionately with
changes in employment levels. In other words, the elimination
of a small number of positions on a base would have little
impact on the cost of providing base services. Indirect costs
should therefore be included in cost comparisons only for
major changes in employment. [Ref. 9: pp. 43-462
Indirect costs may be divided into two categories,
those generated per person-year and those triggered by events
that occur irregularly during a career.
The effects on costs of substituting one type of labor
for another depends on the grade levels of the respective
employees. One of the methods for establishing equivalent
military and civilian grades uses a point-count system to
compare the content of both similar and dissimilar jobs. Each
job is evaluated by the problem-solving skills required and
by the degree of accountability. The point counts are used to
identify civil service grade levels whose median job content
is above and below the median job content of the military
grade being evaluated, thus locating the military grade in
relation to two civilian grades. The job content of a military
grade is then assigned to a point on a percentage scale
between the two civil service grades with the next lower and
next higher median job content. (Ref. 9: pp. 46-47]
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(1) Indirect Costs Incurred Per Person-Year Basis.
Palmer uses four types of indirect costs in his study:
"* Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); including base
exchanges, other resale operations, open mess operations,
and clubs and facilities for military and civilian
personnel.
"* Commissary benefits, available to reservists and military
retirees as well as active duty personnel.
"* Medical and dental care, supports military personnel and
their families in two different programs. CHAMPUS
reimburses most costs of care for treatment obtained from
civilian providers by military dependents, military
retirees and their dependents, and military survivor
families; the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) system
supplies care directly to active duty members, and is
available to CHAMPUS eligibles on a space-available basis.
"* Base operating support (BOS) other than MWR and housing,
generally covers base administration, utilities, other
base services (e.g., fire protection and physical
security), and other engineering (e.g., waste disposal)
activities that might vary with the number of personnel
assigned to a location, BOS also includes some items that
appear more programmatic in nature (such as equipment and
real property maintenance. [Ref. 18: pp. 40-50]
Since civilian personnel are not entitled to use commissaries,
and DoD costs for civilian health care were included in the
direct cost category, commissary usage and medical and dental
care categories pertain only to military personnel.
(2) Indirect Costs Triggered by Events. These costs
are triggered by changes in personnel flows through the
military manpower inventory or the civil service workforce.
Palmer associates these costs with entry, midcareer, and exit
events.
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Costs associated with entry to the DoD
workforce are generally confined to military personnel only.
These costs include the following:
"* Initial uniform and clothing allowances.
"* Permanent change of station moves.
"* Recruitment and examining costs.
"* Educational assistance includes support for four types of
educational benefits for military personnel in addition
to regular military training. Educational. assistance
consists of the Veterans Education Aspistance Program, the
new GI Bill, the kicker benefits and off-duty and
voluntary education.
"* Basic and initial skill training.
"* Enlistment bonuses which are available only to enlisted
accessions who enter selected occupations. [Ref. 18: pp.
55-65]
Cost-incurring midcareer events consist of
professional development education and skill progression
training , permanent change of station (PCS) costs for
SThe kicker bernefit is an additional educational benefit
for nonprior service enlistees with high school diplomas who
obligate for specified lengths of service and enlist in
designated military specialties.
9 Al officers in grades 0-3 through 0-6 are eligible for
professional development education and skill progression
training. All enlistees in grades E-4 through E-7 are eligible
for skill progression training. Civilian personnel also
receive DoD-supported training and education. Some civilians
attend the same training courses (most commonly skill courses)
as military personnel. In addition, some others receive
training and education in DoD-related job skills (such as
computer operations) at DoD expense.
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rotational and operational moves, and continuation and
reenlistment bonuses [Ref. 18: pp. 65-69].
Exit-related costs fall into the following
categories:
"* Compensation paid in the year of separation, such as death
gratuities, lump-sum terminal leave pay, severance pay,
and permanent change of station separation costs.
"* Payments to the Department of Labor to cover unemployment
compensation for current separations. 1
"* Obligations for retirement program benefits. [Ref. 18:
pp. 70-75]
3. Findings
Although they were not developed for the same purpose,
one would expect a fair amount of consistency regarding the
treatment of costs by different studies. However, this is not
the case. A review of the cost elements treated in various
studies reveals inconsistencies: The same costs are sometimes
treated differently and one study may exclude a cost that
another attempts to include. For example, as Beltramo points
out, one report uses DoD standard basic rates for pay and
Bonuses at retention are available only to military
personnel in selected occupations.
11The office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller's
Office presumes that unemployment compensation would be
triggered only by separations of civilians and enlisted
personnel in grades E-1 through E-5. No cost is attributed to
officer losses or to enlisted transfers to officer status,
losses to death or disability, reenlistment, retirement, or
desertions.
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allowance (for military personnel) while another recreates a
similar rate from its component elements; or one study does
not treat retirement probability as a function of each rank
while another does; or a particular study does not include the
cost of specialty training while others do; or some studies
do not include dependency and indemnity compensation,
unemployment compensation, educational benefits, and income
tax adjustments while still others do.
Further research is required bufore an acceptable
determination can be made as to which elements should be
included in a correct cost model. However, the prvvious
subsection, explaining appropriate cost measures, which is
based on a recent Rand study, may be a good example; and a
few tentative comments regarding the exizting models will be
made to provide a perspective as to what may be an appropriate
approach.
If we are to seek to minimize the cost, we must know
what the cost of the possible alternatives are. That is, for
an employee to reach the appropriate level he or she must
first be recruited, trained (formal and/or on-the-job
training), paid, and given administrative and logistical
support. Each of these implies a cost to the government, and
it is the analyst's task to determine how they should be
treated, since the appropriate amounts are often not obvious.
[Ref. 16: p. 7]
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Although it has not been explicitly stated, the cost
of each type of personnel is driven by the policies that are
implemented for it. Regardless of the current status of costs
for military and civilian personnel, the decisionmaking
authorities have some latitude for significantly altering
these expenditures. Previous studies have looked at the state
of personnel cost without giving enough consideration to how
it was reached and why. As Beltramo indicated, such an
analysis might provide an understanding of how costs might be
effectively reduced even without resorting to civilianization.
(Ref. 16: p. 8]
In short, the issue of minimizing the cost for
required personnel services is a complex one. a sound
analytical foundation should be provided befor, any policy
action is taken so that the probability of counterproductive
results is minimized. In this effort, a first step might be
to determine the incremental cost of each class of employee
for the specialty being considered for civilianization [Ref.
10: p. 10]. The next step might be to determine what future
trends are likely that should affect the decision and what
impacts a civilianization decision would have on costs [Ref.
4: pp. 29-30). Reliable policy recommendations may be made
only after this has been done.
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C. OTHER FACTORS BEING CONSIDERED IN CIVILIANIZATION
The previous sections reviewed the concept of conversions,
conversion actions and reports. The sections served to provide
a background to conversion actions overall and to introduce
military essentiality for some positions and cost that must
be considered when conversion actions are being studied. The
conversion of military positions to civilian positions tends
to develop only one view of the entire effort that may be
involved, in particular the factor of cost. However, even cost
factors were not considered in early conversions, as mentioned
in the previous section; and civilians were generally
substituted for military personnel when the position was not
required to be filled by uniformed personnel. Certain factors
are difficult to evaluate and can support having either a
military or civilian occupant in a job, while others may more
clearly differentiate the advantage of having one over
another. Consequently, some factors affecting military to
civilian conversions are discussed in this section.
1. Heritage
The heritage of this country has always stood for
civilian control of the military forces, so that the military
should never be in control of the nation. Therefore,
converting a military position to a civilian position is in
that view the proper goal to achieve. The military is -nc.w
dependent upon scientific and technological progress ir, the
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research and development community outside the military, and,
in fact, outside the government. One recalls the powerful
conflict within the government after World War II concerning
whether the military or civilian institution should exercise
principal control over nuclear activities in the United
States. The final outcome was the creation of a civilian
agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. The same outcome
resulted several years later when a similar contest erupted
over who was going to run U.S. activities in space. Again, it
was decided that a civilian activity, the National Aeronautics
and Space Agency, would conduct the program, and military
elements, particularly the Air Force, were linked in
subordinate roles. Another central government contest resulted
over the potential control of the new national intelligence
activity; and again, a civilian organization, the Central
Intelligence Agency was established. The military won only
one of these conflicts, and it was a relatively minor one.
During World War I and immediately after the war, there oas
considerable debate about the idea that one or more scientists
should sit as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) .
Eventually, the military won. No provision for a civilian of
any kind on JCS was made. After the war, a new superstructure,
intended to increase civilian control, was placed inside the
Department of Defense. The military departments lost status
to DoD. Over the years, that trend has been confirmed and
sustained, as the aiithority and status of the top layers of
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the military departments have been eroded by the largely
civilian layer of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(Ref. 5: pp. 58-59] It goes even further: now people are
asking whether the military needs uniformed strategists, at
all. The data on the decline in status of the Naval War
College, for example, and on the seeming irrelevance of that
institution's curriculum to the promotion of the Navy's flag
officers indicates that, either by conscious design or by
default, the naval high command has answered this question in
the negative. These strategists obtain their own qualifying
education at the nation's top universities and colleges and
then work as consultants to certain of the various private
firms more popularly known as "think tanks". This "corps of
strategists" ace tssentially hired help. [Ref. 20: p. 55]
This idea pervades the thoughts of the common citizen
so strongly that it is often difficult to convince the
American people that the freedom they have can only be
exercised because the military protects that way of life.
[Ref. 4: pp. 28-29] Maintaining civilian control of the
military is a principle which should not be violated; but, on
the other hand, this perception should not affect objectivity
in conversion decisions. There is also the unfortunate belief
among some that civilians should run national programs in
place of their military counterparts because civilians possess
superior abilities.
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This understanding raises the question whether
military society is converging with civilian society or
becoming more unlike American society in general. Wermuth,
for example, citing the work of Moskos, concludes that;
the eventual result will not be pervasive homogeneity one
way or the other, but a pluralistic military in which
divergence would be most marked in combat units, selected
other units, and higher operational command headquarters,
where the traditional military ethos would be cultivated.
On the other hand, convergence would be characteristic of
military units and enterprises concerned with
administrative, educational, medical, logistical,
technical, and other areas not uniquely military--areas
which would be allowed to become, and which are becoming
more civilianized. [Ref. 5: p. 23]
2. Availability of Qualified Personnel
It may be difficult to hire civilians for many of the
military positions identified for substitution. Civilian labor
market problems may very well limit the hiring of civilians
in certain skills and at some geographic locations. The
magnitude of this problem can only be determined by bringing
field activities into the planning of real-life civilian
substitution programs [Ref. 13: p. 56], and by surveying the
civilian labor market situation to determine whether it is
"tight" or not for the particular fields and geographic areas
concerned [Ref. 3: p. 30].
On the other hand, as the supply of high school
graduates decreases, the level of competition among industry,
academic institutions, and the uniformed services will most
likely increase. Industry will probably achieve its hiring
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goals, because they can pay higher wage rate to attract
qualified labor, whereas military pay is tightly controlled
by the Congress. Inter-and intra-service competition will also
increase as a result of such changes as advancing technology
in Army ground and tank units (moving from field guns to
multiple launcher rocket systems), the transition from guns
to missiles in the surface Navy, as well as the introduction
of high-speed hovercraft and gas turbine-driven ships. These
new systems will all compete with the Air Force strategic
missile programs for trainable recruits. The recruiting
environment, therefore, does not look promising for any
employer, especially the military, in the years ahead. [Ref.
6: pp. 7-8]
Several new initiatives could help achieve recruiting
objectives, such as, DoD-sponsored legislation to lift
statutory restrictions on women serving in combat and changes
in enlistment standards that will increase the pool of
eligible young people.
3. Environment
The environment may present an advantage t- either
military or civilian personnel. For example, civilian
maintenance personnel at the depot level receive items for
repair for many reasons, aside from routine maintenance
action, which, in turn, provides exposure to a multitude of
field problems. They have more time available to complete
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their work, but they do not necessarily see the results of
their work in the field. At the depot level, civilian
maintenance personnel may also fail to see the vital
importance of their actions which may also yield lower quality
products.
On the other hand, the military maintenance person who
has seen the results of his or her work under simulated or
real combat conditions knows the importance of this work and
observes the end results every time an aircraft returns.
Military personnel receive combat-oriented training and
experience under simulated and real combat pressures that the
civilian does not normally receive. The military person spends
more time at the squadron level and does not have the same
amount of time a civilian will at the depot level, but he or
she has the experience of the on-site operational pressure.
Thus, environment is an important factor to consider in
conversion actions, not only because of the job conditions
where the person works, but also because each person has a
different environmental/operational background, and may be in
favor of either civilian or military personnel. [Ref. 4: p.
30]
4. Skill Variety
Clearly, there has been no one theoretical explanation
of why and how task attributes affect workers. The way jobs
influence motivation could be partially explained by several
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existing theories, including Maslow's need hierarchy,
Herzberg's two-factor theory, and expectancy theory. To
integrate and synthesize much of the literature on this topic,
a model was proposed by Hackman and Oldham that explains how
jobs influence attitudes and behavior. It is called the "job
characteristics model" and is probably the most researched
explanation of job enrichment. According to Hackman and
12Oldham, skill variety is part of the core job dimension
leading to meaningful work and, therefore, work motivation.
I•n turn, this becomes job enrichment, as described by them.
[Ref. 21: p. 589]
When we consider the types of labor employed by DOD,
military personnel appear to have a disadvantage with
specialized training that leads to positions without the skill
variety that the civilian field appears to have. Morthole
indicates two additional consequences of specialized training
as a result of technological advances. First, civilians may
not be allowed to perform the maintenance functions because
of its specialized nature; second, military personnel may not
be able to perform the maintenance at the higher levels of
maintenance due to their lack of training across the spectrum
of requirements that civilians may have received. The
military, however, offers a broad experience background
through `ob changes due to rotation reauirements. [Ref. 4: op.




30-31] Therefore, this factor is considered neithex an
advantage nor a disadvantage to civilian conversions, but it
should definitely be considered before any policy decision is
made.
5. Equity
Equity theory is based on the thesis that a major
factor in job motivation, performance, and satisfaction is
the individual's evaluation of the equity or fairness of the
reward received. Equity can be defined as a ratio between the
individual's job inputs (such as effort or skill) and the job
rewards (such as pay or promotion) compared with the rewards
others are receiving for similar job inputs. Equity theory
holds that an individual's motivation, performance, and
satisfaction depend on his or her subjective evaluation of the
relationships between his or her effort/reward ratio and
effort/reward ratio of others in similar situations. Most
discussion and research on equity theory center on money as
the reward considered most significant in the workplace.
People compare what they are being paid for their efforts with
what others in similar situations are receiving. [Ref. 22: pp.
448-449] In the Armed Forces, the civilian workforce is
typically considered a support function and the military is
considered to be in the combat arena and available for
national defense.
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The total of repeated combat exposures over a typical
career for a military member would tend, on the average, to
fall into the prop-rtions shown in Table II.
TABLE II
TYPICAL MILITARY CAREER
(EXTENDS OVER 22 YEARS AND EXPERIENCES 9 RELOCATIONS)
Percent of Career
Mil tLry Situation Military Experience
Combat Zone 9.0
Family Separation, Unaccompanied
Tours (Excludes combat, sea duty,
and field duty) 2.8
Overseas (With family, excludina
field duty) 1",.0
Field (or sea) Duty 10.4
Other, Overwhelmingly in CONUS 63.8
TOTAL 100.0
SOURCE: A. L. Wermuth, An Armored Convertible:
Shuffling Soldiers and Civilians in the
Military Establishment, Strategic Studies
Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, October 1979, p. 20.
L5
The model establishes the allocation of various
principal conditions that occur in the average of all current
military careers, and shows that there is some increment of
dlc.dvantage suffered by the average soldier (and sailor or
airman) in comparison with the average citizen in civilian
life, including civilians who work in the military
establishment.
A number of positive conditions equal and balance out
cert-?in negative conditions, but negative conditions are not
balanced out completely. For example, as Wermuth observes, the
following liabilities in military service cannot be adequately
balanced out by citing positive benefits: combat exposure,
frequently directed moves, directed family separations, sea
duty, field duty, unlimited and irregular workweek, exposure
to disease and poor sanitary conditions, isolated posts, loss
of earned leave (for officer only), no right to quit, and
liability to command at sea and in field equivalents. One or
twu of these factors seem possibly contradictory. For example,
the last item (command) is considered in some contexts to be
a positive opportunity, rather than a negative condition.
However, it is apparent that the great responsibility of a
commander at sea or Tn the field, such as command of a nuclear
air,.-raft carrier, involves billions of dollats and hundreds
of men, but no additional. compensation is provided to the
incumbent of the top job. Only the five factors listed below
are subject to some kind of quantification, however partial:
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combat exposure (number of days) 3; frequently directed moves,
including overseas; directod family separation; unlimited and
irregular overtime without pay. (Ref. 5: pp. 20-21] In terms
of duty time and pay, military personnel are on call for 24
hours a day for the same pay,. although they ar- not called
upon to work very often, while civilian personnel will receive
overtime pay for work performed outside the normal duty hours.
(Ref. 4: p. 31] Also, adding a larger number of civilians at
the journeyman, technician, or laborer level changes the focus
of this problem to another issue, such as civilian grooming,
pay differential, union activism, civilian attire, illegal
alcohol usage, and relaxed work habits [Ref. 6: p. 81] . In
this case, when a military individual feels that inequity
exists, a state of tension develops. People try to resolve
this tension by appropriately adjusting their behavior. A
worker who perceives that he or she is being underpaid, for
example, may try to reduce the inequity by exerting less
effort.
13The United States has never paid compensation to its
military members for participation in combat, but has provided
amounts for being liable to exposure to combat. Thus, every
soldier in the U.S. forces in Vietnam, regardless of rank or
assignment, from E-1 to 0-10, whether in a combat unit or an
administrative unit, received "hostile fire pay" of $65 a
month.--a token amount that perhaps overcompensated those
serving at negligible risk and undercompensated those serving
in front-line combat units. All U.S. military persons in
Vietnam with dependents left at home also received a
separation allowance of $30 per month, and exei.iption of $500
of income from federal income tax, for each month served in
Vietnam. (Ref. 5: p. 22]
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The tension, if it exists, is one factor that the unit
manager must accept and try to resolve. Perceived inequities
between personnel become dissatisfiers on Herzberg's
motivation scale. Thus, inequities perceived by unit personnel
become disadvantages which must be resolved by the unit
commander; but, vhen equity is achieved, it is not an
advantage that can be utilized by the unit. Although there is
no direct advantage or disadvantage to either civilian or
military personnel, the lack of equity does affect the unit;
therefore, it may become a disadvantage for military to
civilian conversions. (Ref. 4: p. 32]
6. Performance Appraisals
Such appraisals can be defined as "a systematic review
of an individual employee's performance on the job which is
used to evaluate the effectiveness of his or her work." (Ref.
21: p. 298] Vroom's expectancy theory of work motivation says
that individuals will perform at a certain performance level
if the positive outcomes associated with that performance
level outweigh the negative outcomes. (Ref. 22: p. 446]
Intense dissatisfaction and feelings of unfair treatment can
develop from differing sets of comparisons. As a result,
personnel working in the same office or at essentially the
same job will desire to have a performance appraisal system
consistent with their workmates, But, this is not the case in
work areas employing both civilian and military rersonnel,
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because performance appraisals in the military tend to be
inflated and, at any rate, it is different than the civilian
14
appraisal system . Consa-jantrly, difrenccz can. result which
may ultimately lead to anxiety and resistance by one or the
other with regard to the performance appraisal. Performance
appraisals can affect the worker at any time, but the impact
may have a greater effect on the unit when military and
civilian personnel are working side by side and receiving
appraisals which are different or are perceived to be
different for essentially the same job performance. (Ref. 4:
pp. 32-33] It is hard to predict whether it is an advantage
or disadvantage to a particular conversion action, but it
probably has a negative effect on morale of the unit.
7. Morale
Blum and Naylor define morale as follows:
The possession of a feeling, on the part of the employee,
of being accepted and belonging to a group of employees
through adherence to common goals and confidence in the
desirability of these goals" [Ref. 21: p. 379].
1 4Officers and enlisted men are carefully rated at least
once each year on extensive forms and in elaborate systems of
evaluation of performance, personality, traits, and other
factors. On the rating form for the civilian employee,
however, there are three words: outstanding, satisfactory, and
unsatisfactory. If the rater checks either outstanding or
unsatisfactory, the rater must write out an additional
explanation to justify the rating. If he checks satisfactory,
however, he does not have to add or explain anything. Thus,
an entire year's performance by a civilian employee can be
totally evaluated by a mere check mark on a single sheet of
paper. [Ref. 5: pp. 98-99]
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This definition emphasizes feeling accepted by the work group;
sharing common goals; and believing that these goals are
desirable. Personnel attitudes, turnover, absenteeism,
tardiness, and grievances are all measures of job satisfaction
that refer to the extent to which the organization satisfies
the need of the employees. A downturn in attitude, as a result
of inequities perceived by either civilian or milite.ry
personnel, will result in reduced morale and a corresponding
reduced level of performance and readiness by the unit.
Intermingling of military and civilian personnel creates the
conditions for personnel of two very different groups to
compare their backgrounds and current positions. The resulting
comparisons of job terms (such as those in job descriptions,
working conditions, or the inequality in pay for similar jobs)
causes the difficulties that need to be considered with
conversion projects. A perceived lack of equity between two
groups of personnel is a cause of reduced morale, which
reqults in individual decisions to eliminate the inequity. The
easiest way for a young soldicr to eliminate the problem is
by leaving. Thus, the '&.teri on rate may go down. This
assumption is supported by tL, observation made by Morthole.
During the first phase of Mix Fix, an early conversion action
taken by the Air Force, there was a noticeably adverse impact
on airman morale and first-term airman retention. [Ref. 4: p.
34] Therefore, reduced morale may be a disadvantage in the
military to civilian conversion.
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On the other hand, conversion of some positions, such
as the food service attendant functions, berthing compartment
duty, or passageway cleaning on ships, which require
relatively unskilled labor (and since many of the personnel
are assigned to these undesired jobs temporarily) may have
a positive effect on morale [Ref. 6: pp. 13-14].
8. Civilian Personnel Management
Wermuth (citing the Defense Manpower Commission) notes
that several critical differences exist between the personnel
systems for soldiers and civilians, resulting from differences
in organic law, customs, traditions, roles, and underlying
concepts. The Defense Manpower Commission lists six principal
differences as follows:
Army Civilian Personnel System Army Military Personnel System
Open career system with . Closed career system with
entry possible at any level, entry possible only at bottom
levels.
Rank vested in the job. Rank vested in the person.
* Promotion competition from Promotion competition
within or outside tae Service. exclusively from within.
Contractual relationship . Command relationship
between worker and employer, between worker and employer.
Pay package similaer to . Pay package more
private sector, generally comprehensive, including
limited to base pay and housing, subsistence, medical
occasional over-time, care, commissary and exchange
privileges.
Force heavily unionized. Minimum union impact.
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The military system can be characterized as closed,
person-oriented, and centralized, while the system governing
the management of civilians is open, job-oriented, and
decentralized. Military people usually enter at the bottom of
the grade structure; they are trained and then, as they
progress through the system in a sequence of career-broadening
assignments, achieve appropriate rank and pay raises.
Civilians, on the other hand, move in and out of the civil
service, with grade and pay granted in the job rather than the
individual. Partly because of these features, the military
personnel system receives more attention; long-range
centralized planning is necessary to ensure that people with
the right skills and experience are available when they are
needed. Since civilians can be hired and enter the system in
any job at any level, long-term planning that includes
training programs and career-broadening assignments are not
considered as important. (Ref. 9: pp. 15-17]
In listing, above, the relationship between worker and
employer, different contexts may cause difficulty with the
term "employer." Who is the civilian's employer--the federal
civil service? And who is the soldier's employer--his unit
commander? There is a large sense in which the relationship
evolving between both military and civilian employees and
their employers is closer to a contractual nature than to
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Pay package is also undergoing evolution, expanding
its coverage in portions of the private sector to include
medical and dental coverage, support for dependents, pension
contributions, holiday and annual leave, working conditions,
cost of living supplements, access to company stores, and
other benefits. [Ref. 5: pp. 76-77]
The last item, above, on unions also needs
.amplification. Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act
permits the organization and representation of federal
employees by a union, as well as their right to arbitrate
grievances. The employees have the right to form, join, or
assist a union, and they can bargain collectively or be
represented by a union. Failure to bargai.. Lby either military
management or the union is an unfair labor practice according
to the law. However, negotiations are prohibited if the
negotiations adversely affect the budget or degrade the
mission, organization, security, discipline, or other
significant areas. Strikes may be prohibited based on the
premise tliat government employees provide essential services
in the public interest. [Ref. 4: p. 35]
In any event, the six contrasts listed above certainly
distinguish the two forms of federal employment from each
other. Supervisors are required to follow sound management
principles in theii daily conduct and operations with civilian
personnel. One of the specific limitations requires a
supervisor to coordinate proposed decisions which affect the
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civilian personnel with higher level supervisors and with the
central civilian personnel offict when required. This means
increased coordination for military supervisors, which, in
turn, creates an increased workload for them, and still may
not be as effective as expected 6. Without sound management,
unions have the potential to create difficulties, and a strike
could be damaging to the readiness of the Services.
Especially, utrikes by employees in smaller units in the field
would have a more immediate effect on the unit's own mission,
and would probably be covered by military personnel. While
civilians can bargain for better terms and working conditions,
the military member is bound by his oath and his service
contract to follow official orders, and this would undoubtedly
affect the attitude of military personnel who are prohibited
by law from unionizing [Ref. 6: pp. 51-52]. Unions, through
the possibility of strikes and the increased participation to
negotiate terms, may be considered a disadvantage to
conversion actions. [Ref. 4: p. 36]
Flexibility in assigning civilians may also be a
problem to consider, although the civil service rules on the
management of civilians do not constitute a significant
obstacle. Furthermore, since the civilians under discussion
are to be used in positions not affected by the military
151964-1968 Civilianization Program did not achieve its
full potential because of inadequate guidance and weaknesses
in internal management controls [Ref. 7: p. 28].
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rotation requirements, the need for their reassignment should
be minimal [Ref. 13: p. 55].
9. Discipline
risciplinary actions are handled in a different manner
by the military and by civilians. The intent of civilian
discipline is to attain and maintain a constructive working
environment. In fact, this is also true for military
personnel, but it is oriented towards the combat environment
in order to prevent a breakdown of discipline that could have
tragic results. With the civilian workforce, progressive
discipline typically follows the steps of an oral warning,
written warning, disciplinary layoff or demotion, or
discharge. These steps are part of the grievance process in
most collective bargaining agreements with civilians, but with
the military, there is no union to assist the worker. in the
military, violations of discipline are punishable by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) . While the two systems
basically have the same goal, the methods of punishment are
not the same. As a result, discipline may not be equitable in
the view of the civilian or the military person. (Ref. 4: p.
37] Thus, it needs to be considered before any effort at
civilianization is made.
"In time of war", the UCMJ states, "persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field are subject
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Subsequently, the
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U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional the exercise of
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace or
undeclared war and thus limited military jurisdiction over
civilians in a subsequent UMCJ article, which states that
"persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed
forces outside the United States or territories are subject
to the code. " [Ref. 6: pp. 29-30] Therefore, peacetime
application of discipline for civilians must follow the
procedures summarized above.
10. Legal Concerns
If injured while working aboard a ship, a civil
service employee may file a claim against the government under
the Federal Employees Compensation Act. This act defines and
limits the recovery payment. An injured merchant seaman, on
the other hand, can file suit directly against his employer,
claiming that the ship was unseaworthy. There are no statutory
limits to the amount of recovery in this instance. Legal
defense against the charge of "failing to provide a seaworthy
ship" would be difficult for the Navy because its ships do
not, in most cases, meet the rules and requirements for ship
construction as described by the American Bureau of Shipping
and the U.S. Coast Guard. "Unseaworthiness" could be charged
for such deficiencies as inadequate safety lighting, a missing
guard rail, faulty machinery, or a fire hazard if contract
mariners were injured.
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Also, warship:3 are granted certain sovereign immunity
16
from the jurisdiction of other states by the Geneva Convention
of 1958 because warships are owned and operated by a state and
used on government non-commercial service. A warship, in
addition to belonging to the naval forces of a state, bearing
external markings, being under the command of a commissioned
officer must also be manned by a crew that is under regular
naval discipline. A vessel's status a5 a warship might be
questionable if manned by a large enough number of contractor
employees to be considered as not under military discipline.
Currently, the U.S. ~cvarn~iwn. is not considered an
employer, so military and civil service work spaces are exempt
from the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations
and inspections. If, however, contractor employees were aboard
Navy vessels or aircraft, the civilian contractor would be the
actual employer and spaces could be inspected at a reasonable
time. The primary concern with OSHA regulations is that any
contract employee could complain about ventilation, heat,
lighting, or safety violations, for example, and the Navy or
the contractor would be subject to a violation or potential
work stoppage. Habitability standards for merchant seamen and
civil service mariners are governed by U.S. Maritime
Administration Standard Specifications, U.S. Code Title 46,
lEThis immunity would include such things as U.S. control
over persons on board, freedom from search and arrest, and
exemption from foreign taxation.
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and Military Sealift Command Instructions. Even the
compromised habitability standards for old-type ships would
be beyond active Navy fleet capability if large numbers of
civilians were placed on board. Maritime standards are clearly
too liberal and could not be implemented on warships.
Negotiations with employees or contractors certainly would be
required. [Ref. 6: pp. 35-38, 43-45]
11. Promotion Possibilities
The work situation, which can affect job motivation,
consists of two categories: (l)the actions, policies, and
culture of the organization as a whole; and (2)the immediate
work environment. Personnel policies, such as wage scales and
employee benefits (vacations, pensions, and the like),
generally have little impact on individual performance. But
these policies do affect the desire of employees to reman
with or leave the organization and its ability to attract new
employees. The reward system of the organization, on the other
hand, guides the actions that generally have the greatest
impact on the motivation and performance of individual
employees. Salary increases, bonuses, and promotions can be
strong motivators of individual performance. [Ref. Z2: p.439)
It is vitally important that personnel have the chance to
progress through the expected means of advancement, otherwise
the individuals will leave when they have their most
productive years ahead of them [Ref. 4: p. 38]. The conversion
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of spaces from military to civilian in the senior pay grades
o± a career field may reduce the promotion possibilities of
military personnel in the lower grades and increase personnel
turbulence. Another example, is the Navy's civilianization
policy. The Navy devised a method to reflect the ratings (or
occupations) of mission criticality, replacement costs, sea-
tour leng and reenlistment bonus levels. The result was a
standaidized ranking of ratings from low to high. Lower-
ranked ratings were examined for possible civilianization, and
most of them were in shore billets. Since most of the women
in the Navy are assigned to these shore billets, civilian
substitution could adversely affect their opportunities for
promrnotion. [Ref. 23: pp. 48, 87] This is a key problem which
has to be hanaled by properly designing any civilianization
p.ogram. A solution would be making proportionate conversions
in all pay grades or starting conversions with the lower
grades [Ref. 13: pp. 16-17].
On the other hand, ..he constraints on the substitution
of enlisted pos4.tions will place some limits on the number of
oflicer positions that can be subscituted, since an adeqi te
mrilitaiy chain of cortuT.and should be maintainted to ensurc that
enlisted per.'cnnre are utilized most vffectively. [Ref. 1: p.
1-5-18]
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12. Continuity of Operations
A diffejence in philosophy exists between the military
and the civilian way of life with regard to moving personnel.
The military continues to move personnel once every four to
five years on the average. One of the primary reasons for
moving is to prcvide a broad level of experience and a common
knowledge base for military personnrl to use which has the
advantage of keeping the individuals exposed to new ideas and
procedures that develop throughout DoD (Ref. 5: p. 80] .
Exposure to new ideas or even long forgotten ones is a means
of studying history to prevent mistakes from being re'.peated.
However, civilians tend to prefer stability and move less than
military personnel. They are more stable, tending to ` one
job for longer periods of time. As a result, they not only see
what happened within their own jobs across several years, but
they also remember past procedures that did not work, which
a military person may try to reintroduce. This stability of
the civilians prrvides a continuity of operations ;
therefore, in this context, civilians offer an advantage in
the military to civilian conversion. , 'ef. 4: pp. 38-39]
1For example, tho ptimaiy advantage of using civi'..ans
as DoD p.rozran marnagei s would be program continuity, trý-.nsfer
of lessoi,9 learned, and better working relationships with the
fun,7tioi.al dixectoiates and labu ratuiies -e-ause of the
zedn)ced chan-irig ot the programn managers. [Ru-f. 10: pp. 34-
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13. Readiness
Military personnel comprise the force that is trained
and ready for imnediate deployment anywhere needed to support
national interests. It is also possible to deploy some support
units with the combat units during a wartime situation. If
civilian personnel were assigned to these units, they could
not deploy with their units to a combat zone. Consequently,
replacements from other military sources would have to be
found to replace them or the additional workload must be
absorbed by the military personnel.
Mobility requirements and the absorption of duties
creates a condition related to Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory.
Herzberg proposed two gener.al classes of work variables:
satisfiers--content factors that result in satisfaction---and
dissatisfiers--context factors producing dissatisfaction.
Because of this organization, the theory is known as the Two-
Factor Theory. (Ref. 21: p. 403] In this context, good working
conditions do not necessarily lead to satisfaction; however,
the absence of good working conditions dces lead to employee
dissatisfaction. For the military individual, mobility and the
absorption of work due to the loss of a workmate is generally
accepted as a condition of military life. Borrowing personnel
to fil I a vacant position requires the person to do a job that
he or she Aas not originally designated to accomplish.
Depending on the individual, this may affect his or her
personal attitude and morale. If the unit commander decides
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not to fill the old position at all, the unit operates in a
degraded manner with production and quality falling and lower
overall unit morale. Therefore, mobility and the possibility
of work absorption are elements that must be considered during
any conversion project, especially those that require
mobility. [Ref. 4: pp. 39-40]
on the other hand, different manning philosophies
between the military and the civilian may also deteriorate
readiness. For example, the Navy provides a considerable
number of personnel for range and depth in watch standers at
ship operating and control stations, for maintenance, and for
damage control. And, most technical-rated petty officers have
watch, quarter, and station bill battle condition assignments
which relate to their specialty. Many of these positions are
critical to the fighting capability of the ship or aircraft.
While there is some redundancy in combat assignments, large-
scale deletion of military billets must be limited by combat
watch assignments and their requirements for mi.L'.t.?,r duty
sections in port. (Ref. 6: p. 851 Although there is a c(.rtain
need, the Navy Civil Service and the commercial x--ntra-t
managers place reliance upon unattended equipment and the
employment of off-watch personnel during underway
replenishment operations. Consequently, the two civilianized
options have limited capability to repair combat damage, fight
fires, or sustain casualties. [Ref. 19: pp. 4-53
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In contrast to this lack of mobility of civilians
which may deteriorate overall readiness, in another example,
Blanco claims that using civilians in shipyards to accomplish
work that is normally done by ship's crew during overhaul,
releases the crewmen of these ships from overhaul work. They
may be reassigned to ships at sea, or to the Navy Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), thereby
alleviating critical shortages and improving overall
readiness, or they may be trained during overhaul to increase
the crew's skill levels. (Ref. 14: pp. 10-12] Because of these
both positive and negative implications foreseen, in each
conversion decision, the unique properties and possible
outcomes of each action should be considered before taking any
action.
14. Training
Training is a factor that may be an advantage for the
civilian worker occupying a military position. Military
personnel receive a specialized training for their particular
field and receive a specialty code to indicate their
specialized training on their records. Military personnel
having the same codes can perform their work anywhere in the
world in that field and normally do n:t perform in another
field unless they have cross--training. Civilian personnel
typically have broader levels of training and experience;
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thus, they are more capable of performing an increased number
of tasks in a more efficient manner.
In contrast to this applicability of experience to
their respective fVelds, training requirements for the
military are much higher than those for civilian counterparts
since they receive associated military training not
necessarily related to their specialty. On the other hand,
civilians only needed familiarization training for their
positions since they already had the required background that
the job description required; therefore, civilianization was
expected to reduce the costs and time lost for training [Ref.
4: pp. 41-42]. Moreover, the use of military personnel in
nonmilitary tasks could be an ineffective and inefficient use
of personnel, due to these training costs of military W
personnel [Ref. 3: pp. 59-60] . However, the federal government
has been accused of being dominated by technical professionals
who do not respond clearly enough to the need for learning
more about management. It is said that large private companies
invest 6 to 8 times as much as the average federal agency does
in the development of their executives, and the military
services spend about 8 times the amount in improving the
managerial effectiveness of the officer corps as is spenc on
civilian managers. (Ref. 5: p. 85] In fact, the in-service
training costs of civilian manpower are far from negligible,
especially irn the more sophisticated technical skills and at
the managerial level [Ref. 1: p. 1-5-9], and it is expected
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to increase in the future when we consider the increasing
complexity of systems being used and managerial concerns.
Another issue is the social cost of training. The cost
estimates used make no provision for the possible social costs
involved in competing with the civilian economy for specific
skills. Medical technicians are a good example. These skills
are critically short in the civilian sector. Although the
Services may be able to hire these skills away from the
civilian sector at budget costs lower than those required for
service recruitment and training of military personnel, the
overall social costs of reducing the civilian labor supply of
these skills may be significant. Therefore, the social
benefits of training medical technicians in the military may
justify any additional budget costs. (Ref. 1: p. 1-5-11]
15. Findings
Conversions are very complex actions which require an
in-depth analysis of all the consequences involved from cost
to the morale implications and other human resource factors
that may affect the unit. To rely on cost alone or the release
of military personnel for other combat related duties, without
analyzing the situation, may result in decreased unit cohesion
and readiness. Some of the factors discussed in this section
are neither advantage or disadvantage to a conversion a(.tion,
while very few of them are considered to be advantages. On the
other hand, most of them are disadvantages which affect unit
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readiness. It is highly recommended that cost and the intended
release of military personnel for combat duties should not be
the only factors used to determine conversion actions. Rather,
an investigation including the human resource aspects must
also be accomplished to determine the true picture in each
conversion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of any
future position conversions.
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY-CIVILIAN TRADE-OFFS
The endless supply of inexpensive labor provided by the
draft fostered an environment in which efficient manpower
management was less important than simply meeting
requirements. Resource allocation frequently was driven more
by history and tradition than by resource costs, and this
caused substantial inefficiencies. Introduction of the All-
Volunteer Force, coupled with increased public awareness of
expanding manpower costs, changed this situation. More visible
and tighter defense budgets mean that defense capability will
be severely eroded unless alternative combinations of inputs
are found. The military must find ways to control cost growth
in the future and to compete effectively for qualified
personnel in the civilian market. Effective resource
allo, ation and manpower management are key parameters in
finding cost-effective alternatives. [Ref. 2: p. 269]
A. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Resource allocation refers to the distribution of defense
resources among various missions. Inputs include equipment
(military hardware, such as ships, planes, and artillery),
supplies, and manpower, among others. The point Cooper makes
is that there are lots of ways of achieving a given mission,
each using a different combination of the basic resources.
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Resource allocation refers to how the military chooses
different combinations of inputs and different missions.
Resource allocation is very important since each resource has
costs associated with it.
There are many different technologically efficient
alternatives for achieving a given mission but, given the
prices of the inputs, there is only one combination that is
economically efficient. Thus, the amount of defense that can
be obtained from a given amount of defense spending is
dependent upon how resources are allocated among missions,
and how inputs are combined. To determine the appropriate mix
of inputs, attention should be focused on changes in the
relative prices of these inputs and on the opportunities for
substitution. [Ref. 2: pp. 269-277] To foz. a background for
our analysis, in the following sections we will briefly
examine the issue of capital-labor resource allocation, the
choice of military and civilian personnel, and the
distribution of military personnel between first-termei-s and
careerists.
1. Capital-Labc,. Subst.tution
At the mosti aggregq.te level of decisionmaking, one
important decision in tl-c question of resource allocation is
the mix of capital and labor. For example, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact are compared with
each other not only in terms of manpower strengths, but also
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in terms of capital equipment, such as the number of aircraft,
ships, and tanks held by both sides. The cost of maintaining
the defense establishment is dependent on the mix of capital
and labor inputs.
Capital-labor decisions are motivated by several
factors. The most obvious factor is that the draft
artificially depressed the budget costs of military personnel
and encouraged an overemployment of labor resources relative
to the optimum. The removal of the draft, with concurrent pay
increase, altered the cost of manpower relative to the cost
of other resources. (Ref. 2: p. 278) Given the historical
patterns of capital and labor usage and their relative costs,
we can assess the efficiency of defense resource allocation.
This assessment allows us to determine the effects that the
removal of the draft had for allocative efficiency, and
whether there are opportunities for efficiency gains in the
future, in the form of reduced defense budgets for a given
level of capability or increased defense capability for a
given budget level. Economic theory tells us that as the wage-
rental ratio increases, the military has an incentive to
substitute capital inputs for labor. (Ref. 2: pp. 284-285)
For example, analysis of the Navy's Perry class (FFG-7)
frigate program suggests that the implementation of a gas
turbine power plant, and the newer weapon system resulted in a
reduction of approximately 100 men compared with the old Knox
class (FF-1052) frigate. That is, if a steam power plant had
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been chosen for the FFG-7, and old weapon systems had been
continued, each ship would have required about 100 additional
personnel to man the ship. [Ref. 24: pp. 14-15]
Further capital-labor substitution is possible by the
types of labor-saving technological change produced by the
economy. The continued rise in the cost of labor relative to
the cost of capital, together with labor-saving technological
changes, makes even greater capital-labor substitution likely
in the future. [Ref. 2: p. 290]
2. Military-Civilian Substitution
In addition to capital-labor substitution, there are
equally importanit choices within each of these broad
categories. This section deals with labor-labor substitution
possibilities, in particular military versus civilian
substitution.
As discussed in the previous chapter, manning
decisions have been the result of numerous factors, including
military requirements, personnel management constraints, cost-
effectiveness, and tradition. Military requirements means that
there are some job assignments such as the infantry that are
exclusively military in nature. For these types of
assignments, the basic nature of the job dictates whether it
must be manned by someone in uniform. Cooper estimates the
number of such jobs to be relatively small, no more than 25
percent of the combined military and civilian personnel
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strength. In addition to those jobs, there are a number of
others that must be manned by uniformed personnel for
mobilization purposes. Cooper, in his study of Military
Manpower and All-Volunteer Force, assumed the magnitude of
this mobilization requirement to account for another 25
percent of the uniformed force.
The remainder of the jobs coul6 theoretically be
manned by either military or civilian personnel on the basis
of the job tasks. But many of these are in fact best manned
by uniformed personnel in order to satisfy personnel
management constraints, such as the maintenance of an adequate
rotation base or the provision of sufficient career
opportunities. A simple man-for-man comparison might appear
to be cost-effective, but the end result may not be when these
broader considerations are taken into account. On the other
hand, those military requirements and personnel management
constraints that limit substitution must be separated from
those that are part of tradition. For example, it has been
argued that activities near combat zones must be manned by
uniformed personnel. In fact, the Vietnam experience showed
that civilian contractors can perform satisfactorily in some
support activities.7 [Ref. 2: p. 292]
' Civilian contractors provided key logistical support
in Vietnam, including the operation of supply depots and the
flying of cargo missions, often very close to actual combat.
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The civilian effort consists of several different
elements, including direct-.hire civilian employees of the DoD,
indirect hires, nonappropriated fund employees, and contract
hires. This study focuses on the direct-hire civilian
employees, which constitute two thirds of the total DoD
civilian workforce.
One of the problems in evaluating the desirability of
military-civilian substitution is the lack of good measures
for making cost comparisons. Ideally, wage rates of civilian
and military personnel could be used to evaluate possible
substitution policies. However, the presence of large nonwage
costs, such as training costs and deferred retirement
annuities, makes it impossible to fully capture the cost
implications by the use of simple wage comparisons. The policy
question concerns how the DoD and Congress have historically
responded in terms of the allocation of manpower resources
between military and civilian personnel. If the DoD operates
as a cost-minimizing agency, it should respond to changes in
the relative prices of the two options. As the cost of
military personnel falIs relative to the cost of direct. ires,
DoD should respond by decreasing the use of direct hires
relative to uniformed personnel. Conversely, as the cost of
military personnel begins to rise relative to the cost of
direct hires, the Services again should respond by increasing
the use of direct hires relative to military personnel. In the
following section, we evaluate the past military-civilian
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resource allocatiun in DoD by analyzing the substitution
policy in the 1974-1989 time period. But, before starting that
section, the remainder of this section briefly examines the
mix of military personnel between first-termers and
careerists.
3. The First-Term/Career Mix
The distribution of military personnel by length of
service has been recognized as one of the major manpower
planning issues confronting the DoD. The concern for the
years-of-service distribution of the force derives from two
particular aspects of the military personnel system: its
closed nature, and the strong link between promotion and
length of service. The closed nature of the military personnel
system means that the military draws its experienced personnel
within the system. Thus, the Services must maintain an
adequate number of junior personnel to maintain an adequate
number of experienced employees. (Ref. 2: p. 303]
From a resource allocation perspective, the problem
of choosing the experience mix can be simplified by viewing
it in terms of first--term and career mix.19 This enlisted
experience mix is a significant factor in cost and capability,
and in the personnel issues of grade structure and promotion
19Although the Services differ in length of their
enlistment obligations, it is convenient to view those with
less than four years of years as first-termers and thoseý with
four or more years of service as careerists.
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opportunity given the closed nature of the military as
mentioned above. However, with the tremendous increase in
military manpower and personnel costs, as Albrecht pointed out
in his study of "Labor Substitution in the Military
Environment", attention has shifted to considerations of
economic efficiency in the allocation of these resources.
An efficient mix of first-termers and careerists
should either minimize total costs at a specified level of
effectiveness or maximize effectiveness for a given total
cost. In theory, these mixes are achieved when the marginal
costs of first-term and career personnel just offset their
marginal contribution to military effectiveness. The
difficulty is derived from the inability to accurately assess
the relative productivity and substitutability of various
categories of military labor. (Ref. 25: pp. 5-13]
From a policy perspective, the findings of Albrecht's
cptimization analysis indicate that a redistribution of
manpower resources toward a more senior force in high skill
occupations and towar-d a more junior force in lower skill
occupations would be cost effectiv9, despite the fact that
reenlistment bonuses may be required to retain additional
careerists in high skill occupations.
1. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The preceding discussions provide the basis for evaluating
past military-civilian manpower resource allocation in the
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DoD. As indicated previously, if the cost of military
personnel falls relati%;e to the cost of direct hires,
efficiency considerations would dictate that DoD respond by
decreasing the use of direct hires. To test whether DoD has,
in fact, responded in the directions dictated by efficiency
is the ob3ective of the next section.
1. Variable Selection and Model Specification
The demand for labor may be derived from the demand
by a nation, its citizens or their representative~s, for
national security or defense expenditures. DeBoer and Brorsen
assume the existence of a social welfare function
W = W(MC) (1)
where
W = social welfare;
M = national security; and
C = aggregate civilian purchases.
The defense department. combines military inputs to produce
national security. The security production function is
M = M(L,K,I) (2)
where
L = military labor;
K = military capital; and
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I = a measure of international security conditions.
The nation's legislature is assumed to maximize social welfare
through its budget and tax decisions, and to purchase the
security maximizing combinations of inputs, subject to the
budget constraint
Y = C + wL + rK (3)
where
Y = national income;
w the military wage; and
r the rental cost of military capital.
The constrained maximization of equation 1 subject to equation
3 yields a demand for military labor function in national
income, relative military input prices, and international
security conditions,
L = L(Y,w,r,I) (4)
[Ref. 26: p. 857)
To apply the demand model to defense civilian labor,
we use the niumber of full-time, permanent civilian personnel
in DoD at the end of each fiscal year as the dependent
variable. Because of differences in calculating their
respective wages and differences ill substitution
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possibilities, wage-rate and nonwage-rate jobs are treated in
two different demand functions.
The price of military labor in this study is
calculated as active duty regular military compensation. For
defense manpower requirements, full-time, permanent civilians
and active duty military personnel are assumed to be
substitutable for each other; wage-rate workers are assumed
to be substitutes for enlistees and nonwage-rate civilian
employees are assumed to be substitutes for officers.
All personnel entitled to active duty compensation
receive the following elements:
a Basic Pay;
- Basic Allowance for Quarters, Variable Housing Allowance,
and Overseas Station Housing Allowance;
* Basic Allowance for Subsistence;
* Federal Income Tax Advantage. [Ref. 27: p. 20]
Such personnel may also receive other elements of military
compensation depending on the nature of their duty assignment,
their military specialty, where they are stationed, their
conditions of service, and so forth. But, for our simple
historical comparison, we did not attempt to calculate cost
savings by substituting one for the other; regular military
compensation will meet our expectations.
The prices of civilian labor employed in defense are
measured as the compensation for fr' l-timc, rrn•.hL
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employees. Wage-rate and nonwage-rate employees are placed in
two separate categories. The compensation numbers are derived
by as3uming that full-time employees work 40 hours a week, and
do not include the other pays--primarily c .'rtime and holiday
pay--and benefits--life insurance, health benefits, worker's
compensation, and pension and retirement benefits. Since
benefits are not included in military compensation numbers,
these basic compensation numbers for civilian employees are
compatible with active duty regular military compensation.
If DoD responds as the efficiency hypothesis suggests,
and if civilian and uniformed personnel are substitutable, the
coefficient on the civilian defense labor price should be
negative, while the coefficient on military pay should be
positive.
Gross national product is used as the income measure,
and is expected to affect labor demand positively, assuming
that national security is a normal good and civilian labor
contributes positively to it. DeBoer and Brorsen point out
that several studies have found a positive relationship
between national income and military purchases, though none
have looked at labor specifically [Ref. 26: p. 858].
Increases in international tensions require more
inputs to produce a given level of security, though the rise
in the implicit price of security could cause the legislature
to shift toward civilian purchases. We include a dummy
var'able for the Reagan administration, to test for
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significant variations in security during his administration,
which was a milicary build up period. President Reagan took
office in fiscal year 1981, so that the Reagan administration
dummy equals one beginning in fiscal year 1982. The dummy
measures deviations from the Ford-Carter administration
(fiscal years 1974-1981).
With these four explanatory variables the end strength
demand model for wage-rate workers is:
ESTRENGTH = f (ENLRMC, COMP., GNP,REAGAN)
where
ESTRENGTH, = end strength, the annual end-of-year
level of wage-rate workers in the
armed forces;
ENLPMC = enlisted regular military
compensation;
COMP. = wage-rate worker's compensation;
GNP = gross national product;
REAGAN = a dummy variable for the Reagan
administration, fiscal 1982-1989.
The end strength demand model for nonwage-rate employees is:
ESTRENGTHn = f(OFFRMC, COMP1, GNP, REAGAN)
where
ESTRENGTH, = end strength, the annual end-of-year
level of nonwage-rate workers in the
armed forces;
OFFRMC = officer regular military compensation;
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COMPn = nonwage-rate worker's compensation;
GNP = gross national product;
REAGAN = a dummy variable for the Reagan
administration, fiscal 1982-1989.
2. Data and Estimation
Data were taken from different sources and compiled
together for the ±974-1989 time period, all on a fiscal year
basis. Average salary and numbers of people in each category
for all permanent, full-time, wage board and non-wage board
civilian employees by grade were derived from March 1990
20
Defense Manpower Data Center's Civilian Master File, and are
displayed in Appendix A. Detailed regular military
compensation tables for officers and enlistees by grade are
obtained from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Force Management and Policy Compensation Directorate, and are
presented in Appendix B. National defense spending and Gross
National Product, in current and constant Fiscal Year 1982
dollars, for the same 1974-1989 period were derived from the
Fiscal Year 1991 Historical Tables of the Office of the
Management and Budget, and are presented in Appendix C.
Descriptive statistics were calculated to present the
data in such a way that the meaningful essentials of the data
can be extracted and grasped easily. Arithmetic mean, which
20Data were supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California.
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is the most popular and useful measure of central location,
and st'ndard deviation, which is the positive square root of
the variance of the measurements, s.re presented in Table III.
TABLE III
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS







DEFSPEND (in billions) $180.42 79.78
GNP (in billions) $3163.47 1195.32
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Mean endstrengths of wage and nonwage-rate positions
are 282,487 and 593,246, respectively during 1974-1989 time
period. Average compensations of officers and nonwage-rate
civilians are $31,626 and $21,409, respectively during the
same time frame. Officers and nonwage-rate civilians are
accepted to be substitutable for each other. Average payments
for enlistees and wage-rate civilians are $14,788 and $20,081,
respectively during the same time period. Like officer-
nonwage-rate civilians trade-off, enlistees and wage-rate
civilians are substitutable for each other. Average gross
national product and defense spending for 1974-1989 time
period are $3,163 and $180 billion respectively.
The models for wage-rate and nonwage-rate demand are
first estimated using ordinary ]east scLiares (OLS) regressinn
model by using current year values, plus with real values
adjusted to 1982 price level, and finally using two stage
least squares (2SLS) technique.
3. Estimation Results
Estimation results for ordinary least squares
technique using current year values are reported in Tables IV
and V.
In the end-strength demand equation for the wage-rate
workers, in Table IV, wage-rate compensation has the e.,.,..cted
negative coefficient, and is statistically significant. The
other factor price coefficient, enlisted regular military
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compensation, also has the expected positive sign. Though the
coefficient is not significant, it demonstrates that DoD
responded to factor price changes by substituting one for the
other. The insignificance of enlisted regular military
compensation may be due to its collinearity with wage-rate
worker's compensation (correlation coefficient = .74).
TABLE IV
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE WAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(OLS ESTIMATION USING CURRENT NUMBERS)








* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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Gross national product has an unexpected negative
coefficient, which is statistically significant. We hd
expected that the economic growth would increase the demand
for labor overall. But, probably because of the shift in
defense civilian workforce toward non-wage jobs during this
time period, we observed this negative effect on the end
strength of wage-rate positions. The same gradual shift was
indicated by Cooper [Ref. 2: p. 295]. The dummy variable
coefficient for Reagan administration indicates positive
difference in the taste for civilian labor comparing to the
previous Ford-Carter period, perhaps associated with the
military build up.
In the end-strength demand equation for the nonwage-
rate workers, in Table V, average salary for nonwage--rate
employees has negative coefficient, as expected, and is
significant. The other factor price coefficient, officer
regular military compensation, also has the expected positive
sign, and is significant at the 10 percent level of
significance. These results suggest that DoD responded to
factor price changes by substituting one input for the other
in the direction suggested by efficiency. Gross national
product has a positive, significant coefficient. Economic
growth increased the demand for nonwage-rate labor.
98
The dummy variable coefficient for Reagan
administration indicates the same significant and positive
difference in the taste for civilian labor as for wage-rate
jobs in Table IV.
TABLE V
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE NONWAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(OLS ESTIMATION USING CURRENT NUMBERS)









* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 1 percent level.
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As a second step to catch the real effect, each factor
price is divided by the composite deflator which adjusts the
numbers to 1982 prices. In addition, we used gross national
product in 1982 figures to insure homogeneity. These
estimation results are presented in Tables VI and VII.
TABLE VI
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE WAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(OLS ESTIMATION USING CONSTANT 1982 NUMBERS)








* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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In the demand equations, we observed the same positive
coefficients for enlisted and officer regular military
compensation, which means that as the price of military
personnel increased, DoD responded by substituting civilians
for military.
TABLE VII
ESTIMAT ON RESULTS FOR THE NONWAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(OLS ESTIMATION USING CONSTANT 1982 NUMBERS)








* Significant at 10 percent level.
Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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However, in contrast to estimation results in current
numbers, civilian compensation coefficients have an
unexpected positive sign in both estimations, though it is
not significant for wage-rate workers. It means that DoD did
not respond to price changes of civilian employees in real
terms, although it did respond to changes in current values.
It should have substituted military personnel for civilian as
the real price of civilians had gone up. Gross national
product and dummy variable have the same signs as in the first
estimations.
As a third step, we suspected that a simultaneity bias
may affect the demand models. Compensation figures,
explanatory variables of our civilian labor demand model, may
be a function of the level of employment in a truly
simultaneous model. To address this question, we specified
two supply equations for each civilian group:
COMP. = f(ESTRENGTHW, DEFSPEND, REAGAN)
COMPn = f(ESTRENGTHn, DEFSPEND, REAGAN)
where
COMP. = wage-rate worker's compensation;
COMP= nonwage-rate employee's compensation;
ESTRENGTH = end strength, the annual end-of-year level
of wage-rate workers in the armed forces;
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ESTRENGTHn etid strength, the annual end-of-year level
of nonwage-rate employees in the armed
forces;
DEFSPEND = defense spending; and
REAGAN = dummy variable for the Reagan
administration, fiscal (1982-1989).
The end strength of wage-rate and nonwage-rate workers
and their respective compensation were assumed to be
endogenous variables in the simultaneous system. All the other
variables are treated as exogenous and used as instruments to
explain the endogenous variables. The models are estimated
using two stage least squares, and estimation results are
reported in Table VIII and Table X for the demand functions,
and in Table IX and Table XI for the supply functions.
In the two stage least squares estimation for the
wage-rate workers demand equation in Table VIII we observed
the same effects as in the ordinary least squares estimation:
own-price has a negative coefficient and the price of enlisted
military personnel has a positive coefficient. That means DoD
reoponded correctly to factor price changes, even when the
simultaneity was captured. DoD employed less civilian as the
price of wage-rate workers increased. DoD also responded to
changes in price level of military personnel by substituting
more civilians,
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The only difference in two stage least squares
estimation from the ordinary least squares estimation is that
the negative effect of gross national product, and the
TABLE VIII
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE WAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION)








* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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positive effect of the Reagan administration on the end
strength of wage-rate worker are not significant anymore for
wage-rate workers in Table VIII.
TABLE IX
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE WAGE-RATE COMPENSATION
(TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION FOR THE SUPPLY EQUATION)







* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
105
I Ij
In the nonwage-rate workers' demand estimation using
two stage least squares technique in Table X, the effects are
exactly in the same direction as they were in ordinary least
squares estimation.
TABLE X
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE NONWAGE-RATE LABOR DEMAND
(TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION)








* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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The only difference is that the coefficient of the
other facto. pri le (officer regular military compensation) is
significant in the new estimation, while it was not
significant in ordinary least squares estimation.
TABLE XI
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE NONWAGE-RATE COMPENSATION
(TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION FOR THE SUPPLY EQUATION)







• Significant at 10 percent level.
Significant at 5 percent level.
Significant at 1 percent level.
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C. FINDINGS
As discussed previously, if the cost of uniformed military
personnel falls relative to the cost of direct hires,
efficiency would dictate that DoD respond by decreasing the
use of direct hires.
Ordinary and two stage least squares estimations for both
wage-rate and nonwage-rate equations demonstrated that own-
price has negative and the price of military personnel has a
positive effect on the end strength of defense civilians.
These results indicate that DoD responded correctly to factor
price changes, even when potential simultaneity bias was
accounted for. DOD employed fewer civilians as the price of
wage-rate workers increased and vice versa. In another words,
it responded to changes in price level of military personnel
by substituting more civilians.
However, in contrast to estimation results in current
numbers, in the second estimation using real figures, civilian
compensation coefficients have a positive sign in both
estimations, though it is not significant for wage-rate
workers, in Table IV. It means that DOD did not respond to
changes in the real price of civilian employees. It should
have substituted military personnel for civilians as the real
price of civilians had gone up. DoD responded to the price
changes in real figures in only one direction: it employed
more civilians as the price of military personnel increased
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but it did not respond to the increasing price of civilians
which might substitute military for them to allocate the
resources efficiently.
Gross national product has an unexpected negative,
significant coefficient for wage-rate workers' demand
equation. We had expected that economic growth would increase
the demand for labor overall. The reason for this negative
effect, as explained earlier, may be the shift in defense
civilian workforce toward non-wage jobs during the time period
concerned. The dummy variable coefficient for the Reagan
administration indicates a significant positive effect on the
demand for civilian labor during the Reagan build-up. It may
be caused by the increasing effect of cold war and some small
scale conflicLs on military build up during this period.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is a growing concern regarding the cost of national
defense. One reason for this is that many people believe that
immense defense spending is the cause of economic ills. And,
in this huge, but decreasing, defense spending, personnel cost
has received considerable attention. These concerns indicate
the urgency of searching for a means of reducing personnel
costs without causing unacceptable reductions in war-time
readiness.
The military/civilian mix of the force has been discussed
as one solution to this problem. The argument has been made
that civilians should be substituted for military personnel
wherever possible, because this has been seen as a means of
maintaining military force levels in a zero-draft environment,
and because they have been said to be less costly. This
argument, of course, recognizes that certain billets must be
filled by a member of the military because of the reasons
mentioned in Chapter 2. These include law, training, security,
discipline, rotation, combat readiness, or the need for
military background to successfully perform assigned duties.
Although "least cost" is an implir. criterion in the
guidance concerning military-civilian determinations, cost
prolably was not a primary consideration when the military-
civilian determination policy was first developed. Civilians
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were placed in all positions not requiring military incumbency
because of the DoD policy that "civilians shall be used in ell
positions which do not require military incumbents." And, it
was simply assumed that civilians were less expensive.
However, as discussed previously, if the cost of
uniformed person falls relative to the cost of a direct hire
civilian employee, cost-minimization would dictate that DoD
respond by decreasing the use of direct hires. In this thesis,
estimations for both wage-rate (blue-collar) and nonwage-rate
(white-collar) equations demonstrate that price of civilians
has the hypothesized negative effect, and that the price of
military personnel has the hypothesized positive effect on the
end-strength of defense civilians. These results indicate that
DoD responded correctly to factor price changes, even when
21
simultaneity bias was accounted for. DoD employed more
civilians as the relative price of civilians decreased, and
less as the relative price of civilians increased.
However, in contrast to estimation results using current
dollar values for the variables, in the second estimation
using the dollar values adjusted to 1982 price level, civilian
compensation figures have a positive sign in both estimations,
21As explained in Chapter 3, we suspected that a
simultaneity bias may affect the demand models. Civilian
compensati.n figures, which are explanatory variables of the
civilian laLbr demand model, may be a function of the level
of employment in a truly simultaneous m~odel. To account for
t' ! possible simultaneity effect, same demand models were
Pv -N.ated using the two stage least square technique.
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though it is not significant for wage-rate workers. It mneans
that DoD did not respond to changes in the real price of
civilian employees. It should have substituted military
personnel for civilians as the real price of civilians
increased. DoD responded to the price changes in real figures
in only one direction: it employed more civilians as the price
of military personnel increased; but it did not respond to the
increasing price of civilians.
In present circumstances, the total cost of filling a
white-collar job with a federal civilian is less on average
than filling the same job with an equivalent military
employee. In the case of a blue-collar job, military recruits
diminish in the face of demographic and economic trends, and
it is likely that military pay will increase more rapidly than
federal civilian pay. If this occurs, the financial advantage
of replacing military personnel with white-collar civilians
would grow larger, and it may even become profitable to
consider blue-collar substitution, particularly if legislation
is enacted to correct the anomalies in the blue-collar wage-
setting process. [Ref. 9: p. 74)
For purposes of determining the least costly resource
(military or civilian), one would expect a fair amount of
consistency regarding the treatment of costs by different
studies, (although they may not have been developed for the
same putpose) . However, this is not the case. A review of the
cost elements treated in various studies reveals
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inconsistencies as the same costs are sometimes treated
differently. Furthermore, it is found that one study often
excludes a cost that another includes. Additional research is
required before an acceptable determination as to which
elements should be included in a correct cost model can be
made. Nevertheless, the present model, which is based on a
recent Rand study, may be a good example.
In short, the issue of minimizing the cost for required
personnel services is a complex one. Thus, a sound analytical
foundation should be provided before any policy action is
taken so that the probability of counterproductive results is
minimized. To this end, a first st•,p might be to determine the
incremental cost of each class of employee for the specialty
being considered for civilianization [Ref. 16: p. 10] . The
next step might be to project the future trends that are
likely to affect the decision and what impacts a
civilianization decision would have on costs [Ref. 4: ,p. 29-
30]. Only after this has been done, can reliable policy
recommendations be made.
On the other hand, the conve% sion of military positions
to civilian positions tends to develop only one view of the
entire effort that may be involved, in particular, the factor
of cost. Yet, even cost elements were not always considered
in early conversions, as mentioned previously; civilians were
often substituted for military personnel when the position was
not required to be filled by a uniformed personnel. Certain
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factors, mostly not quantifiable, are difficult to evaluate,
and can support either the use of military personnel or
civilians in a job, while some others may have either
advantages or disadvantages, as discussed in Chapter 2.
Consequently, some factors affecting military-to-civ.ilian
conversions should be discussed in detail even after
determining that one type of worker may be cheaper than the
other.
Policy changes are required if one wants to go beyond the
position conversions, from military to civilian, having been
done so far. It would dictate using civilians in units and
under conditions that have traditionally been considered the
military's domain. In today's changing military environment,
under current threat concepts, further substitutions by
civilians may be required to reduce the defense budget and
allocate limited resources effectively. Specific examples were
given to show the possibility of further conversions. One of
them is in the Navy's fleet support. [Ref. 9: pp. 57-58] A
more extreme example is the use of civilians on Navy
combatants--coming as a result of attitude changes toward
women at sea, the success of Military Sealift Command's
civilian-manned replenishment oilers, the abundance of
technical representatives on carriers and surface ships, and
extensive civilianization ashore. A negative conclusion drawn
from this example is that the direct wages and benefits paid
to a Navy enlisted man fall short of the wage level required
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to attract a civilian to work on a ship. This pay differential
between seamen and civilians on the same ship will undoubtably
cause further military retention problems. [Ref. 6: pp. 97-
98] Also, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that
the Navy use civilians in shipyards to accomplish work that
is normally done by ships' crew during overhaul. The crew
released from overhaul work could be reassigned to ships at
sea, thus alleviating some of the critical shortages on these
ships; or skilled technicians could be transferred to critical
shore activities such as the Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activities (SIMAs); or they could be trained to increase the
skill levels during overhaul. [Ref. 14: pp. 12-13] Another
specific example given by Binkin is the possibility of
transferring to civilians the part of airlift and air
refueling missions now carried out by U.S Air Force personnel.
[Ref. 9: pp. 58-59] Because of the nature of its operations,
the Army appears to have feir opportunities than the other
Services to employ civilians in units traditionally manned by
soldiers. However, support units, operating exclusively in the
rear areas, could be considered for civilian substitution
[Ref. 9: p. 59]. One can observe that majority of the military
personnel are performing supervisory, administrative, and
other technical functions in industrial facilities. GAO
believed civilians could do these functions; in fact,
civilians were occupying either first-or second-level
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supervisory positions in the operating departments at the
activities mentioned. [Ref. 7: pp. 18-19, 26, 29-30]
On the other hand, efforts to allocate resources
effectively may hamper wartime readiness, which should be
considered in conversion decisions. For example, attempts to
balance medical manpower requirements with budgetary
constraints have led to staff reorganization within the
Medical Service. As a rciult, the Dental Corps relinquished
98 active duty cental officer authorizations to favor the
Nurse Corps. To compensate for the lost active duty dental
slots, 98 civilian contract dental slots were made available
in CONUS. Civilianization of the Dental Corps, as designed,
may not reduce the Corps' clinical capability to produce
adequate dental services to maintain a peacetime military.
Rut, in fact, because of the lack of readiness education and
training on the part of the civilian contract dentist,
civilianization will reduce the Corps' overall readiness
capability. [Ref. 15: pp. 2, 3, 9-12] For the reason mentioned
above, which explains the effect of further civilianization
on wartime readiness, the civilianization potentials indicated
in different studies should be examined cautiously before any
attempt is made.
However, Binkin found that some of the complaints commonly
voiced by the military were based on incorrect perceptions.
The authority to transfer or reassign civilians was found to
be less restricted than military managers argued. Complaints
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about the inability to deal effectively with marginal
employees are also ill-founded. Current regulations appear to
provide managers with adequate tools that are not being used
consistently c- effectively. The implications of the relative
immobility of the civilian workforce have been overemphasized.
On the other hand, Binkin argues that some problems cited by
defense managers were found to have greater validity.
Reductions-in-force of civilian employees have an unusually
disruptive effect on productivity largely because of
regulations that give priority to seniority, veterans'
preference, and the like, rather than merit. Present
legislation and regulations governing the civilian retirement
system present obstacles to effective management. Defense
managers are hampered in tneir efforts to manage the work week
effectively because of the excessively restrictive legislation
governing hours and days of work for civilian employees. [Ref.
9: pp. 80-81]
In short, the Services recognize that certain billets must
be filled by a military person because of the military
requirements. 22 Remaining billets, theoretically, can be
filled either by a military person or a civilian. Thus,
22A clear distinction must be drawn between jobs that,
for reasons of national security, should be filled by military
employees and those that can be filled by civilians. The
Services review in detail the job structure of each military
service and defense agency, the deployability of these
billets, and the policies governing rotation, promotion, and
career development of military personnel. [Ref. 9: pp. 75-76]
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incremental cost of each class of employee, for the specialty
being considered for civilianization, needs to be determined,
and the future cost trends needs to be projected.23 After
these have been done, one can claim that one resource is
cheaper than the other, and can recommend in favor of
conversion. However, before making a reliable policy
recommendation, one should consider the other human resource
factors. This would then allow the Services to have only the
most essential manpower on their payroll, to reduce the total
amount spent on training and on other expenses, and to get the
greatest return for their money.
23Since civilians are paid out of operations and
maintenance funds, over which local commanders have control,
each civilian hired means less money for other use of these
funds. Military personnel, on the other hand, are free since
they do not affect the local commander's budget. This bias
should be eliminated by a change in the method of accounting.
[Ref. 9: p. 81]
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DESCRIPTION OF ABBREVIATIONS USED AS COLUMNAR HEADINGS
COLUMNAR HEADING DEFINITIQN
GS General Schedule Ci ilian Employee
GM General Schedule Civilian Employee
(Managerial Positions)
WG Wage-Grade Civilian Employee
WS Wage-Grade Civilian Employee
(Supervisory Positions)
WI, Wage-Grade Civilian Employee
(Leadership Positions)
BPY Base Pay
BAQ Basic Allowance for Quarters
BAS Basic Allowance for Subsistence
ALL BAQ + BAS
CPY BPY + BAQ + BAS
SST Social Security Tax
FIT Federal Income Tax
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